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A study was made of human factors affecting operations
of U.S. Navy destroyers. Shipboard duties were analyzed to
determine factors relevant to job performance. These
factors were then considered in the light of related
laboratory experiments, field and exercise results , and
modern theory, to determine where improved performance
could be achieved within existing personnel and material
resource constraints.
Topics include vigilance and motivation; search tech-
niques; sensor optimization; man's total environment
(factors such as fatigue, stress, lighting, temperature,
noise, medication, and smoking); group and individual
psychological needs; human engineering requirements; and
typical performance effectiveness criteria.
The author has completed department head tours in
nuclear attack submarines and guided missile frigates. He
is a surface warfare specialist, qualified in submarines,
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I. PREFACE
Human factors is not an exact science, but an art in
which the operator cannot be expected to attain absolute
perfection. However, consideration of the factors discussed
in this paper will make "absolute perfection" a little less
unattainable. This paper does not examine equipment design
per se, although in many cases increased efficiency could
be realized through better human engineering. Baker, C. H.
(1962) discussed one case where such changes appear
necessary:
"The machine (airplane) itself is always an engineering
marvel, the radar electronics are usually excellent, but,
almost invariably, the actual operating end of the radar
where one receives the information for which all the money
was spent, is an unfortunate combination of design and
operating errors. As a consequence, the effectiveness of
the whole system is largely vitiated."
This paper examines the performance of man in the
context of a larger system, the U.S. Navy Destroyer. Where
man's performance can be improved the system will often
perform better, often dramatically so (Teel, 1971) . If such
gains can be achieved with only slight or inexpensive human
factor adjustments, then such adjustments can become an
important and useful tactic in our efforts to improve
overall operations.
Some readers may be uncomfortable with the unusual
approach taken in presenting various principles. Stress,
for example, will be found discussed in the context of the
Officer of the Deck. Search Technique, under the Lookout.

It would have been possible to have discussed the principles
as chapters themselves, and then simply suggested which per-
sons might be most affected. The Author believes that he has
selected the more readable presentation; and since the actual
"operating end" of this paper will be the reader, it seems
apropos to consider him first in the design of the paper.
The intended reader is not just upper level management.
It is felt that after reading this paper, anyone can gain a
little better understanding of how he performs in a variety
of situations. For certain deficiencies, understanding
becomes the key to improvement. So that this paper can be
made widely available, it has been kept unclassified. Nothing
has been lost by this; human factors principles are general
principles, and where applicability to a specific piece of
equipment or classified operating procedure may exist,
applicability exists in the unclassified sense also.
Undoubtedly, the number of bibliographical references
will be distracting to some. Unfortunately this is the
nature of the subject and the Author can only be apologetic
of the fact. He also apologizes to those nameless authors
who might find their original conceptions unintentionally
adopted here without proper credit. An assumption made in
this paper was that references would not be available to the
reader, and where some additional information might be
necessary for understanding a certain idea, that information




Human factors in the original sense are the component
capabilities and limitations of man which in total determine
how he will function as a seeing, hearing, manipulating,
talking, and understanding mechanism. Human factors as a
discipline has emerged as a recognizable specialty only
during the first several decades of this century. As a
discipline, human factors is a direct descendant of industrial
engineering and psychology, the later science evolving about
the same time from its original foundations of physiology
and philosophy. Meister and Rabideau (1965) provide a his-
torical review of early literature in this field. Lately,
the term human factors has developed many different connota-
tions. The most comprehensive listing and discussion of
present usages is contained in Meister (1971).
In this paper we will be concerned with human factors
principles as they apply to the existing shipboard environ-
ment. We will examine exercises and experiments for instances
where human operators have had an observed effect on total
system performance. From analysis of these effects, and
application of existing human factors theory, we intend to
develop practical recommendations for specific actions a
Commanding Officer may take to improve the performance of
man-machine systems under his control.
Although this paper is the first attempt to apply human
factors principles to overall destroyer operations, military

interest in the subject goes back to studies of problems
connected with flying in World War I. Later, the greatly
increased technology of World War II created an urgent need
for expanded human factors research and development. The
U.S. Navy Operations Evaluation Group (OEG) was formed at
this time to develop ways to best use existing equipment to
combat the Soviet U-Boat (Steinhardt, 1946). Although human
factors had not yet surfaced as a recognizable specialty,
OEG was in fact pioneering in this field. Much of their
work was classified, but in the spring of 1947 the first
coherent public discussion of the subject was conducted at
the Naval Postgraduate School, Annapolis, Maryland. The
papers presented at that time were significant milestones
in that for the first time a large group of engineering
officers — men who in the future would be responsible for
putting human engineering to work in the navy, were finding
out what human engineering was all about. These published
papers are found in Chapanis, and others (1947)-
Other publications began to appear forming an expanding
body of unclassified human factors literature. Included
were Loucks (1944), Anderson, and others (1944), Office of
Scientific Research and Development (1945), Garner (1946, a),
Chapanis (1946), and Garner, Hanes, and Reed (1947)- McGrath,
Harabedlan, and Buckner (1959), and Brlctson (1971) provide
reviews of later literature in this field.
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A. HUMAN FACTORS REQUIREMENTS
From this beginning the military has developed an ever
increasing awareness of the subject, and now includes human
factors specifications in all new systems and equipment
designs
:
1. MIL-STD-1472A, 15 May 1970, Human Engineering Design
Criteria for Military Systems, Equipment and
Facilities
2. MIL-H-24148, 3 June 1968, Human Engineering
Requirements for Bureau of Ships Systems and
Equipment
3. MIL-H-46855A, 2 May 1972, Human Engineering
Requirements for Military Systems, Equipment
and Facilities
4. MIL-H-8l4iJ4, 1 September 1966, Human Factors
Engineering Systems Analysis data.
These equipment design standards represent individual tactics
in our modern approach to obtaining optimum performance from
systems. All systems, at some point, require human operation,
If a system is not operating optimally, or if operation at
a particular level requires too great an expenditure of
human resources, often knowledge and application of certain
human factors principles can provide us with a policy to
achieve greater efficiency or a higher level of performance.
An overall policy or strategy is clearly needed. Simply
increasing lighting, moving status boards or writing design
standards, as knee-jerk responses to certain specific com-
plaints or suggestions does no more towards improving the




...The president of a large corporation recently
put this question to me: "For the past fifteen
years we have been making surveys of employee
attitudes. Our assumption was that when we got
this material we would have a good guide to company
policy in employer-employee relations. We have
been disappointed. We got lots of suggestions
for tactics but few which helped us to formulate
strategy. As a result we have installed washrooms,
changed lighting, adopted various benefit schemes,
revised our incentive system, and made other
adjustments. But the basic nature of the human
being, the basic principles that govern his reac-
tions to the environment we create for him, the
knowledge that would enable us to predict how our
workers will react to a given change, such things
are still cloudy. We need to grasp those things in
order to devise strategy and policy. ' A fifteen-
foot shelf of reports and no answers to these





The strategy we employ today may be given any of several
labels :
1. Leadership
2. Organizational Performance and Human Effectiveness
Practices
3. Human Resource Management
^ . Management
However the objective remains the same: to do more, and to
do it better, with less. Although there may be a difference
in philosophy between these four schools, the recommendations
of this paper are interdisciplinary and should apply in
general to the Navy destroyer as a man-machine system.
It is important to place the scope of this paper in
perspective, and to consider its relevance in today's mili-
tary environment. First, the modern destroyer is an extremely
12

complex weapons system, with a multiplicity of equipments
and subsystems. She is manned by a crew of individuals who
belong to different groups at different times and who have
both individual and group motivations and aspirations. The
destroyer's mission varies, as does the environment and
condition under which she is required to operate. In this
paper, only certain individuals or watchstations will be
discussed. Further applications can be made by individual
Commanding Officers. What should always be considered is
the effect of a particular innovation on time system , in
this case the destroyer. For example, the methods we might
adopt if we were interested only in achieving the greatest
number of initial detections by lookouts would be different
from what we'd do if we were also interested in the speed
and accuracy of reporting, processing, and displaying that
information. From the standpoint of optimizing overall
destroyer performance, we must be concerned with all these
later aspects of the lookout's function, plus the ability
of the propulsion plant and steering systems to carry out
any actions ordered as a result of this information.
At the same time we are optimizing on the level of our
single destroyer, others are carrying out similar processes
at the Squadron level, Fleet level, and Department of De-
fense level, to name but a few. The personnel and equip-
ment resources v/hich we have to v/ork with are assumed to
be those which exist on our ship today. We have only a
limited ability to change equipments once provided, or to
13

increase manning levels once established. This paper does
not discuss specific design improvements which could be
made to existing equipments, nor does it make naive recommen-
dations requiring overall increases in manpower above existing
levels. Since Commanding Officers do have local authority
•to approve or initiate certain changes which may have human
factor impact, a brief check-list is provided which may
serve as a general guide in these situations.
It seems likely that future personnel resources will
remain scarce and cost more. The people who we do have must
function as effectively and efficiently as possible, and as
a consequence human factors knowledge related to this
objective becomes increasingly important. The following
messages to all navy men from the Chief of Naval Operations
provides additional incentive:
"...THE NAVY'S GREATEST RESOURCE LIES IN OUR HUMAN
ASSETS... MY OBJECTIVE IS TO IMPROVE THE MANAGEMENT OF OUR
HUMAN RESOURCES BY ENHANCING OUR UNDERSTANDING OP... PEOPLE
November 1970 (Z-55)
"... IN THE COMING YEARS OUR CHALLENGE PROMISES TO BE
EVEN GREATER THAN IN THE PAST. AS THE ALL-VOLUNTEER NAVY
DRAWS CLOSER AND AUSTERITY CONTINUES TO REDUCE OUR FUNDING,
IT WILL BE INCREASINGLY NECESSARY THAT EACH INDIVIDUAL
SHOULDER A LARGER PORTION OF THE JOB...
July 1971 (Z-93)
"...TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO ALL NAVAL UNITS IN MEETING THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE 1970 ' S... DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT BOTH
EDUCATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS WHICH
PROVIDE THE MEANS TO ACHIEVE INCREASED COMMAND EXCELLENCE
THROUGH INTEGRATION OF MEN AND MISSION III A WAY THAT THE
SKILLS AND CREATIVITY POSSESSED BY NAVY PERSONNEL WILL BE
FULLY UTILIZED. . .THE SUPPORT OF ALL NAVY MEN AND WOMEN IS
NEEDED I!! THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE NEW INITIATIVES IN
ORDER THAT WE MAY DEVELOP AN ENVIRONMENT TO IMPROVE BOTH THE




B. HUMAN GOALS AND HUMAN FACTORS
The U.S. Navy's recently implemented Human Goals Plan
(OPNAVINST 5300.6, 1973) is intended "to ensure the develop-
ment of the full potential of its human resources and appli-
cation of that potential toward maximum effectiveness in the
performance of the Navy's primary mission." The programs
which comprise the Navy's Human Goals Plan are organized
into five major categories:
1. Human Resource Management consisting of:
•Organizational Development and Management
•Intercultural Relations
•Race Relations, and
•Drug and Alcohol Education
2. Equal Opportunity
3. Drug and Alcohol Abuse Control
4. Career Motivation
5. TRANSITION/Second Career Planning and Assistance
An objective of this paper is to draw attention to the fact
that human factors must also be considered in achieving
this desired goal of maximum effectiveness. The human
factors to be discussed in this paper are the variables
involved in:
1. The characteristics (capabilities and limitations) of
man
2. The characteristics (design features) of individual
equipment and machine systems
3. The relationships between them.
C. RESEARCH EFFORT
Over one thousand human factor related documents have
been reviewed in preparing this paper, and many of these
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were summaries of additional experiments or studies. Most
of this literature can be categorized as emphasizing one or
more of the following functional areas. Significant docu-
ments in each category are referenced.
1. Human Factors Engineering
. Emphasis on equipment
design. Bennet, Degan, and Spiegel (1963), Chapanis (1965),
Machol (1965), Meister and Rabideau (1965), McCormick (1970),
Meister (1971), and Van Cott and Kinkade (1972) are
representative
.
2. Human Performance . Emphasis on psychological and
physiological factors. Broadbent (1958), Jayle, and others
(1959), Swets (1964), Green and Swets (1966), Fitts and
Posner (1967), and Kryter (1970) might be included in this
category.
3. Systems Analysis . Current literature emphasizes the
man-machine relationship and blends the equipment design
factors with human performance characteristics. As such,
this category overlaps the preceding two. 'The important
distinction is that here we have an attempt to evaluate the
product of man-machine combinations in order to optimize
the product for a given expenditure on the machine and its
associated personnel. Goldhamer (1950) cam be singled out
for its historical precedence. Singleton, Easterby, and
Whitfield (1967) provide a convenient collection of articles
emphasizing this systems approach.
4. Analysis of Operations . Analysis of observations
of exercise or field data. Byrd (1930), Wolfe and Mulholland
(I960), Poulton (1965), Radloff and Helmreich (1968), Layton,
Sandeen, and Baker (1971), and Destroyer Development Group
(1973) are examples.
5. Vigilance . McGrath, Harabedian, and Buckner (1959),
McGrath (1961), Franklin, Schumacher, and Tiedemann (1964),
and Halcomb and Blackwell (1969) provide bibliographies,
summaries and abstracts of vigilance literature. Basic texts
include Buckner and McGrath (1963), Davies and Tune (1969),
and Mackworth (1970).
6. Reliability . Several publications on reliability
include significant discussions of the human factor as it
affects system reliability . Aerospace Reliability and
Maintainability Conference (1964), Miller, G.E., and others
(1964) and Ireson (1966) are among the most complete.
16

7. Human Performance Models and Simulations . Variables
considered in these models give insight into real world
variables which we may use to improve human performance.
Moore and Work (1967), Levy, G.W. (1969), Smith, R.L.,
Westland, and Blanchard (1969,a,b), Siegel and Wolf (1969),
and Meister and Ramo (1971) are good examples.
8. Management and Leadership . Very often successful
management or leadership practices derive their success from
fundamental human factors principles. Taylor (1919), Wolfe
and others (1959), Roethlisberger and Dickson (1967), Eddy,
and others (1969), Donnelly, Gibson, and Ivancevich (1971),
Cleland and King (1972), Hampton (1972), and Lawless (1972)
are management oriented references.
In every case, regardless of the author's emphasis, what
was looked for were clues or practices which would lead to a
recommendation as to how a destroyer Commanding Officer might
create a more favorable human factors environment or achieve
better performance through improved human factors practices.
The bibliography has excluded many references which are
undoubtedly well known and widely used by various human
factor specialists. For the most part, included material
provides insight about human factor variables which might be
changed to improve system performance. Other excluded
materials were either outdated or had been incorporated in
later publications. In some cases, older literature is
referenced for its historical value. This paper is based on
experimental results and technical reports which were
available at the Naval Postgraduate School, and on modern
theories of motivational behavior and vigilance. For those
with access to the UPS Library, technical reports are
referenced in standard bibliographical form (Thesis Manual,





D. GENERAL PRUDENTIAL RULE
Finally, In a paper such as this, no claim of correct-
ness should ever be made. Many of the proposals are based
on laboratory studies. Chapanls (1967) » a pioneer in human
factors research, summarized the problem:
"By their very nature laboratory experiments are at best
only rough and approximate models of any real-life situation
First, of all the possible independent variables that
influence behaviour in any practical situation, a laboratory
experiment selects only a few for test. As a result, hidden
or unsuspected interactions in real-life may easily nullify,
or even reverse, conclusions arrived at in the laboratory.
Second, variables always change when they, are brought into
the laboratory. Third, the effect of controlling extraneous
or irrelevant variables in the laboratory is to increase the
precision of an experiment but at the risk of discovering
effects so small that they are of no practical importance.
Fourth, the dependent variables (or criteria) used in the
laboratory experiments are variables of convenience. Rarely
are they selected for their relevance to some practical
situation. Last, the methods used to present variables in
the laboratory are sometimes artificial and unrealistic.
The safest and most honest conclusion to draw from all
these considerations is that one should generalize with
extreme caution from the results of laboratory experiments
to the solution of practical problems."
All too often human factors research obtains results
similar to a now famous two year study undertaken by the
Hawthorne Works of the Western Electric Company. (Chapanis,
and others, 19^7). The experiment was a very simple one
involving five women who were assembling telephone relays.
As reported:
"He (The Experimenter) gave them two 5-minute rest
periods-production went up. He gave them two 10-minute rest
periods—production went up some more. He took away the rest
periods-production still went up some more. He gave them
rest periods again-production went up. He gave them free
lunches-production went up. He took av/ay the free lunches-
production still went up."
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As an analyst, this experimenter could have simply selected
the measure which increased production the most, and recom-
mended this to the Electric Company management. The
artifact which he would have missed would have been that of
morale — the girls knew they were being given special con-
sideration and they felt they were an important part of the
experiment. Anything the experimenter did resulted in more
production. This is a frequent result when we have poor
experimental controls; and it is an unfortunate fact that
applied research, and field experiments, simply do not have
the controls which are possible in good laboratory research.
Many basic human factors principles are involved in each
activity of man. In complex activities such as the vigilance
and control functions of destroyer watchstanders we find that
different factors assume greater significance in some situ-
ations than they do in others. The combinations and domi-
nances of various factors is dynamic and independence
between factors seldom exists. However some generalizations
might be made by observing that at each watchstation man must
perform some unique function. We can determine what factors
seem to have the greatest relevance to that function, and
then discuss principles and develop recommendations that
might be applied to improve system performance. Although
particular watchstations are cited, the principles and
recommendations are not unique and might be applied in
general to similar situations.
19

This paper attempts to be skeptical about much of what
human factors claims to offer in an applied sense, and the
reader too should be skeptical about adapting any general
recommendations to his particular circumstances. It is
hoped however that in many cases the information will be






Vigilance is such a pervasive factor of the human
endeavor that it is difficult to name a single task which
does not require some measure of vigilance. Vigilance
principles applied to the Radar Operator can be applied
almost without modification to every other watchstation
discussed in this paper. Understanding the principles of
vigilance is a prerequisite to successful application of
human factors methodology to the field of Destroyer opera-
tions. Almost any condition measured, sensed, or manipulated
by man seems to have some effect on his vigilance performance,
Smith's (1966) basic vigilance model has nine "major"
variables and a number of "minor" variables, and requires
four assumptions and three supporting corollaries.
The ancient rule of the prudent mariner was echoed
in a Pacific Fleet Letter by then Fleet Admiral Chester
W. Nimitz, U.S. Navy when he wrote (Noel, i960): "Eternal
vigilance is the price of safety," and at least one ship,
the USS JOUETT (DLG-29) has adopted as a motto the words:
"Eternal Vigilance." But how eternal can vigilance really
be, and what is the true nature of this almost intangible
commodity?
In this conventional usage, "vigilance" is charac-
terized by an alertness to danger, or watchfulness. But
21

"vigilance" has a slightly different meaning in human factors
literature. Historically, according to Marshall (1970):
"A by-product of ... (man* s) .. .evolution towards automation
has been the requirement for man to monitor the operation
and/or the output of a system. This new requirement for
man has resulted in the observance of a definite decrement
in the ability to effectively perform monitoring tasks of
a routine nature. One of the first extensive studies of
this monitoring decrement was performed by Mackworth (1950).
In his study, Mackworth introduced the term "vigilance" to
refer to an observer's readiness to detect infrequent,
aperiodic, small changes in the environment."
Today, it is quite common to find "vigilance" defined as a
detection problem, "...characterized by extended periods of
continuous observation. Signals can occur at any time during
the long period, without warning ..." (Green and Swets, 1966).
Mackworth should be credited not only with introducing
a new meaning for vigilance, but also for forming the mold
in which a never ending stream of vigilance experiments has
poured from. Within barely seven years of Mackworth' s study,
the Medical Research Council (1957) was able to identify the
following variables as effecting a common vigilance (inspec-
tion) task:
"(1) Inherent task conditions . Under this heading
(a) the frequency of faults; (¥7 the type of fault;
(c) the difficulty of the discrimination required;
(d) the number of objects displayed simultaneously;
(e) the number of dimensions on which the objects vary;
(f) the temporal structure of the sequence of faults;
(g) the distribution of faults of different kinds and degrees;
(h) the 'meaningfulness' of the task, that is, the nature
of the objects to be examined; (i) the number of classes
into which the objects must be sorted; (j) the number and
nature of 'additional' operations required (for example,
'booking' )
.
"(2) External conditions . These include variables like
(a) the speed at which the task must be performed; (b) the
total length of the task; (c) the frequency of the rest-pauses;
22

(d) the effects of various kinds of interpolated activity
during breaks on subsequent performance; (e) the degree of
isolation of the subject; (f) illumination, contrast, noise
and atmospheric conditions; (g) time of day or night, lack
of sleep; (h) knowledge of results, that is, awareness of
performance efficiency; (i) amount and nature of reward,
that is, incentive systems; (j) presence or absence of
objective reference standards, and their intermittent
variation.
"(3) Individual variability ."
By late 1968, more than 300 vigilance studies had been com-
pleted in the Mackworth tradition (Smith and Lucaccini,
1969). "New" factors continue to be added almost daily, and
lists could be drawn up which include different and additional
factors for each individual vigilance task. The objective
of this paper is not to cite all the possible variables
effecting shipboard vigilance, but rather to select and
examine in turn those factors about which we are tradition-
ally the most concerned, or over which we have the means to
change to advantage. The first of these factors is "Time
on Watch."
2. Vigilance Decrement with Time
The flood of previously mentioned vigilance studies
continues unabated today, and from this deluge there seems
to have developed a certain "Mariner's Law" which states:
"Maximum vigilance can be maintained for a period of about
30 minutes, after this performance deteriorates sharply."
Lookouts are rotated, and sonar operators are periodically
spelled, in accordance with this law. The Law, however,
was repealed by Elliott (i960):
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"Until recently, at least, researchers have been greatly
preoccupied with what might be terned the Mackworth 'A'
effect. This effect appeared in the Clock Test (Mackworth
1950) in which the watchkeeper' s performance deteriorated
after about 30 min and then was maintained at about the
same impoverished level for a further 90 min. This form of
behaviour has never been found in any closely simulated
radar or asdic (sonar) search. Occasionally, when operators
have been subjected to an arduous series of watches a
•fatigue' effect has been observed, but it has been a
continuous degradation of performance throughout the watch.
More commonly there are no 'fatigue' effects during continuous
two-hour watches. What we might call the Mackworth 'B'
effect also leads to some disconcerting observations. This
effect was seen in the first 30 min of the Clock Test, where
operators missed about 15 per cent of the signals which a
completely efficient operator would have detected (in the
subsequent 90 min the rate of missed signals increased to
nearly 30 per cent). In other words, the vigilance situa-
tion was such that operators were immediately inefficient
at the beginning of a watch. In military tasks we do find
this 'B' effect, and it is the effect which plainly limits
the efficiency of a search system. Despite this, and the
fact that the 'B* effect is a little larger than the 'A'
effect (at least in Mackworth's own experiments) the 'B'
effect has received little attention: it is often quite
ignored while theories explaining the 'A' effect are developed
in profusion, and experiments to test such theories are
multiplied."
Teichner (1972) waded through the pool of available
vigilance literature published between 1950 and 1971 and
extracted methodological information and actual data. Based
on analysis of this data three major factors appear to
influence the probability of detecting a visual signal as
a function of time of watch:
"(1) the Initial percentage or probability of detection,
i.e. the normal or pre-test level,
"(2) the duration of the watch, and
"(3) whether the signal-eye relationship is static or
dynamic, i.e. whether it produces or demands continuing





"... it is worth noting ... that we could locate only
two acceptable data sets using radar simulation ... In
neither case was there a decrement in performance with time."
Figure 1 is a family of curves obtained by superim-
posing plots of performance vs. time for experiments with
different ranges of initial detection probabilities. There
are some important similarities among the curves. First, the
o
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FIGURE 1 Per Cent Detections vs. Time on Watch for
various initial detection probabilities
(Teichner, 1972)
maximum decrement is fairly small in all cases. Although
some of the curves appear to have the same asymptotes, the
general impression is of a family of negatively accelerated,
decreasing functions. Secondly, no decrement is suggested
for the 30 to 39 per cent interval. Where the task provides
only a small initial probability of detection, there appears
to be no "time on watch" effect. It is this latter type of
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low probability environment that shipboard watchstanders
frequently encounter. This fact suggests that we should not
be preoccupied with providing relief for such watchstanders
every 30 minutes, when there are more significant human
factors which should be occupying our attention.
This is not to say that during periods of sonar
contact prosecution, fire control engagement, or multiple
target radar tracking, 30 minute breaks offer no advantage.
A possible interpretation (there are many; Davies and Tune,
1969) of Figure 1 is that a high initial "Per cent Detection"
corresponds to a fairly boring task — the operator must
respond to something that is easily sensed or observed.
This type of task is most sensitive to a performance decre-
ment with time. The more challenging task, the one where
there is a smaller probability of detection, seems less
sensitive to the time decrement.
In investigations of particular vigilance tasks
where performance did deteriorate with time, Bergum and Lehr
(1962) demonstrated a great improvement in detection perform-
ance over a 90 minute interval when the interval was broken
into three 30 minute segments by ten minute rest periods.
Bevan, Avant, and Lankford ( 1967) provided similar intervals,
but allowed only five minute rest periods during which sub-
jects either (1) engaged in vigorous physical exercise;
(2) solved anagrams; or were (3) subjected to sensory restric-
tion. All three of these experimental groups performed the
vigilance task at a high level with no decrement throughout.
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Thus, in the case of unchallenging (this may be an extremely
easy task, or possibly a search for such a rare object that
it no longer represents a challenge) vigilance tasks it
appears that the best human performance will be achieved by
providing some opportunity for operator "recovery" about
every 30 minutes.
This period of 30 minutes seems relatively well
established in the literature. Meloy (1970) questioned
whether a more open-ended arrangement would improve perfor-
mance. That is, would it be desirable to offer as an incen-
tive the possibility of early release from watch if a certain
level of performance (detection rate) could be achieved in
an early portion of the watch? Although Meloy' s finding is
highly dependent upon the nature of his particular experi-
ment, he could find no significant difference in either
probability of detection or false alarm rate when this Incen-
tive was added. In other circumstances discussed in Section
IV, goal specificity has been found to be a significant
factor which can produce performance gains.
3. Temperature Effects
As early as 19^0 the British Industrial Health
Research Board (Chapanls, and others, 19^7) determined that
people differed a lot In what they thought was a comfortable
environment ( '. ) , but found the following temperatures and
ventilation seemed to suit the average person:
1. For very light work in the winter the best average
temperature is about 65° F.
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2. For active, light work in the winter from 60-65° F.
3. For work involving more muscular exertion in the
winter from 55-60° F.
In hot weather, "the temperature should be kept as low as
possible by thorough ventilation. The supply of fresh air
should not be less than about 1,000 cubic feet per person
per hour and should preferably be greater. In winter the
rate of air movement should be about 20 to 40 feet per
minute, and in warm weather higher velocities are desirable.
The relative humidity should not generally exceed 70% and
should be less if possible."
These are the general requirements for an environment which
will make the average person feel comfortable; refinement
but little change is reflected in more recent engineering
handbooks (American Society of Heating and Ventilating
Engineers, 1953). Figure 2 presents data from Mackworth
(19*16) which indicates that the temperature at which man can
work if required without any loss in efficiency may differ
from his subjective feelings about what's most comfortable.
75. BO* 85* 90* 95* l60*
EFFECTIVE TEMPERATURE IN DEGREES FAHRENHEIT
FIGURE 2 Average Number of Mistakes Per Man Per




Effective temperature is an index which combines into
a single value the effect of temperature, humidity, and air
movement on the sensation of warmth or cold felt by the
human body (See Table 1 for representative relationships).
The numerical value is that of the temperature of still,
saturated air which would induce an indentical sensation.
Although Figure 1 does not indicate what would happen at
effective temperatures below about 78 F. , it has been found
through later research that as temperature is reduced below
50° F.
,
precision of hand and finger movements is reduced;
however there are no materially adverse effects on so-called























































































TABLE 1. Effe ctr/e Tempe:ratures and Rel;itive Humiditjj for
Various Conditions of Air Velocity, Dry Bulb
Temperature, and Wet Bulb Temperature (Degrees
Fahrenheit). Table developed from data contained
in American Society of Heating and Ventilating
Engineers (1953), and Weather Bureau (1941).
(See Manual For Ship's Surface Weather Observations,




Present U.S. Navy Heating/Ventilating/Humidity standards
(MIL-STD-1h72A) require:
1. Maintenance of the interior dry bulb temperature
at 68°F.
2. Ventilation at a minimum of 30 cubic feet per
minute per man, two-thirds of which should be outside air.
Air velocity shall be less than 100 feet per minute, and
less than 65 feet per minute if possible.
3. Humidity values should approximate 45 per cent
relative humidity at 70°F. This value should decrease with
rising temperatures, but should remain above 15 per cent to
prevent irritation and drying of body tissues (eyes, skin,
respiratory tract).

























4 . Warmth-Fatigue Differences
Pepler (1959) examined a possible relationship
between fatigue and warmth of surroundings. Evidence was
sought on whether environmental warmth and a moderate
sleep loss would have the same kind of effects on radar
operator performance. Following analysis Pepler concluded:
1. Both conditions increased alignment errors in
tracking and gaps in serial response.
2. Following sleep loss (one night deprivation),
subjects tended to omit responses on the serial-choice task,




3. In the warmth the same men did at least continue
to respond to both the tasks, but their attempts were less
successful
.
These qualitative differences between the effects of environ-
mental warmth and lack of sleep suggested to Pepler the
generalization that: "Warmth reduces accuracy; sleep loss
reduces activity." Although sleep is often subjectively
associated with warmth, it appears from this study that the
two are unique factors which have different effects on
performance. Although the degree of fatigue suffered by a
particular radar operator is often beyond the control of
the Commanding Officer, the temperature of his environment
is not. Maintenance of a cool CIC is recommended.
5. End-Spurt Effect
Another factor contributing to vigilance over which
the Commanding Officer frequently has some control is the
"End-spurt" effect. An experiment performed by Bergum and
Lehr (1963a) demonstrated that in a vigilance situation
where subjects had knowledge of time remaining in the vigil,
their performance was superior to subjects who did not.
Based on this result, duration-of-search information should
be disseminated whenever it is available. Withholding such
information may have a deleterious effect on search
efficiency.
6 . Heavy Meals
Certain "heavy meals" such as spaghetti or other
pasta favorites seem to possess almost soporific qualities.
The effect of no meal, of a standard meal, and of a high-fat
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or high-carbohydrate meal, on the visual performance and
fatigue of individuals was studied by Simonson, Brozek, and
Keys (19^8). Performance measures included the ability to
carry out an inspection task, and visual testing. Sub-
jective questionnaires were completed to provide a measure
of subject discomfort. The analysis of results showed that
no one type of meal was optimal for all functions; perform-
ance was poorest after the high-carbohydrate meal, but the
subjective discomfort was least. The standard meal was
preferable for the majority of the visual functions.
Although short term performance gains might occur as a
result of scheduling a high-fat meal, or avoiding a high-
carbohydrate favorite; individual crew-preference considera-
tions and the need to achieve a long term balanced menu at
reasonable cost would frustrate any long term attempts to
improve performance by diet alone.
B. SEARCH PROCEDURES
1. Discussion
This Section tacitly assumes that the operator is
vigilant and knows that in a matter of seconds he will be
expected to respond to a radar contact to the best of his
ability. It is also assumed that the radar is optimally
maintained, although certain operator adjustments may be
required and are discussed below. The factors which can be
used to achieve the optimal performance from the radar
system can be categorized:
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1. Awareness of propagation anomalies which generate
false or missed contacts. This is such a well publicized
part of the sonar problem that similar effects on radar
systems are often overlooked. The operator's performance
will be better if he is not "penalised" for errors properly
attributable to anomalous propagation (False contacts and
their relationship to operator performance are discussed in
Section IV. )
.
2. Radar adjustments and external factors controlled by
the operator.
3. Search techniques to be used by the radar operator
or combinations of operators to improve detection performance
2
. Anomalous Radar Propagation
The problems caused by anomalous radar propagation
are often incorrectly attributed to operator or equipment
malfunctions. The fact that the problem may even disappear
after the operator or Electronic Technician makes a few
adjustments further supports the initial (incorrect) diag-
nosis. The problems of anomalous radar propagation are
often short lived, or completely undetected; and information
regarding the nature of the problem attracts little interest
and receives even less dissemination. Sherar and Rosenthal
(1973) provide a very complete discussion of this phenomenon
which has been slightly rearranged and condensed in the
following pages:
"Anomalous propagation of radar energy — commonly
referred to as AP or simply as radar refraction problems —
is a serious concern to the Fleet but one that is not likely
to be satisfactorily solved in the near future.
"A number of factors can complicate the radar coverage
pattern on a given day. These include such items as equip-
ment, operator, and calibration problems, as well as a host
of environmental factors such as reflection, refraction,
diffraction, and scattering. Birds can sometimes cause
distinct unexpected returns. Over oceanic regions, such
phenomena as sea clutter can drown out all other sea surface
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targets on a windy day; multipath (receiving of both a
direct and sea-reflected ray) can cause gaps in elevation
coverage. But one of the most significant phenomena of all
when considering anomalous propagation and ghosts is the
process of refraction.
"Refraction is the process in which energy rays are
bent, because of changes in their velocity of propagation,
caused by the ray's travel through mediums of varying
density and composition.
"As early as World War II, the importance of refraction
to the propagation of radar energy was widely recognized.
It was observed that one radar would be able to pick up
targets far beyond the normal radar horizon while, at other
times, a radar could not detect an object which could be
clearly seen visually. Possibly the most distant surface
targets ever detected by radar were points on the Arabian
peninsula seen from a 1.5 meter radar at Bombay, India,
during the dry season — a distance of about 1,500 miles.
During the wet monsoon season, the same radar had difficulty
seeing surface vessels only 20 miles away.
"The actual radar coverage pattern obtained at a given
time has as much to do with the "geometry" of the situation
as it does with the refractive index variations. The angle
at which radar energy intersects a refractive layer deter-
mines the future course of the beam. Radar energy beamed
at angles greater than five degrees is bent in a generally
normal, gentle manner regardless of the refractive condition
of the atmosphere and produces expected coverage and detec-
tion. On the other hand, radar energy beamed at very small
angles to the horizontal (especially near one degree or less)
can, in the presence of very strong refractive layers, be
channeled, trapped, or ducted parallel to the earth's surface
and be propagated far beyond the normal radar horizon. Such
layers act as natural "wave guides," channelling and con-
stricting radar energy and frequently leading to the detec-
tion of targets at ranges that would otherwise be beyond the
radar's capability.
"In between, there may be a wedge of air space remaining
which is essentially void or at least very deficient of
radar illumination. This "radar hole" — is an aberrational
air space within a region of expected normal radar coverage,
which, owing to strong refractive layers, is not illuminated
by a radar at small look angles. Thus, a radar scanning
the skies during routine tracking or special naval encounters
may be plagued or enhanced by both holes and ducts.
"Of special importance to ship radars, in addition to
strong, elevated layers, is a feature termed the "evaporative
duct." This is a region approximately 30 to 90 feet thick
3H

at Its maximum, resting on the surface of large bodies of
water in which the refractive index decreases so rapidly with
height that low angle radar energy may be substantially
trapped. The resultant duct is caused by the rapid decrease
of moisture in the first few tens of feet above the water
surface and is directly related to the difference in tempera-
ture between the sea surface and the air immediately above,
as well as the air's local humidity and wind characteristics.
Unlike the elevated layers there is no distinct "top" to
the duct. The evaporative layers can produce greatly exten-
ded ranges for shipboard surface search radars whose antennas
are situated within the duct and pointed at very small ele-
vation angles. However, since the shallow evaporative duct
typically does not extend as high as a ship's superstructure,
ship's radars may be above this region and unable to take
advantage of its potential for extended range as they look
down into it. Thus, with a strong evaporative duct, it is
possible for a submarine to pick up distant ships which
cannot see the submarine because of both the size of the
submarine target and the fact that ship radars may be above
the duct. If both submarine and ship radars are located
within a strong evaporative duct, it might be possible for
both of them to detect distant incoming fliers or missiles
also located within the duct, just skimming above the water's
surface (assuming a low Sea State).
"The importance of the evaporative duct to the Navy
lies not only in its potential ability to propagate energy
from surface radars well beyond the normal horizon but also
as a possible mechanism for explaining some of the mysteri-
ous unverified returns known as ghosts. There is a contin-
uing controversy over whether these puzzling apparitions can
be explained by low, strong elevated ducts, by irregulari-
ties in space of the evaporative duct, or by low-flying
birds. Hopefully, probing of the evaporative duct by
scientists will determine if there is any such ghostly
influence ..."
There are other factors related to the refraction
problem. "For instance, some atmospheric irregularities
not detectable visually can cause backscatter from refrac-
tive Interfaces large enough to produce detectable signals
on a radar scope. This is often the source of "weather
clutter" when no storms or clouds are present ..." Another
is radar frequency, "for thin surface ducts, as the radar
frequency is lowered, an increasingly greater change in
refractive index between the surface and the duct top is
required for trapping to occur."
"Occasionally, a process called multipath may cause an
added confusion factor to the evaluation of radar covert:
and the identification of ghosts. Multipath occurs when
there are two signals returned from a target, a direct one
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and a bounced or sea-reflected one. If the path of a target
causes a land mass or Island temporarily to come between
the target and the radar, the reflected signal may be
Interrupted leading to drastic changes in radar range, and
the target may disappear. This may lead to the erroneous
conclusion that the radar had been tracking; a ghost when the
target was real. But while the importance ©f these other
factors should not be minimized as they relate to the over-
all refraction and radar coverage problem in the atmosphere,
the structuring and layering of the atmosphere itself re-
mains the greatest concern when discussing refraction. It
is the factor which often causes today's ra.idar coverage to
appear normal and tomorrow's radar coverage- to seem like
a complete mystery.
"What type of atmospheric or weather conditions distin-
guishes the days having standard refraction from the. days
which produce anomalous propagation, radar holes, and
trapping? And which ones appear to favor ghosts?
"It might seem paradoxical for the most troublesome radar
weather to occur in what otherwise appears to be perfect
operating weather, but this is not at all inconsistent with
atmospheric theory or observation. The reason is that clear
weather is frequently associated with the eastern side of
vast high pressure regions in the lower and. middle atmos-
phere which produce a subsiding flow of dry air. This down-
ward moving dry air precludes thick convectlve cloud forma-
tions which might lead to rain and inclement weather, and
produces a warming and drying out of the air. The net re-
sult is a warm, dry air mass overlaying a shallow, cool,
and — if over water as off the California coast — rela-
tively moist layer just above the surface. If one progressed
upward through these two different air masses, he would find
that the moisture dropped rapidly with height and the temper-
ature Increased with height through the inversion. At the
same time, he would observe a very strong sniper-refractive
gradient. Sometimes, the shallow cool marine layer contains
fog or low stratus clouds. Near islands and land areas,
warming by the sun and local wind effects evaporate this
thin cloud layer, typically resulting in a clear sky by
midday. Undetected by human eyes, however, is the residual
presence of a very strong super-refractive layer and poten-
tial disaster for the unsuspecting force commander in that
area. Over much of the Mediterranean and probably regions
like the Red Sea, the warmer waters and drier air above
apparently preclude the low cloud formation so that the
prevailing clear skies give no indication of the presence
of refractive layers above the surface.
"Sometimes, the large-scale weather patterns combine
with the small-scale evaporative conditions at the sea
surface and form a single, exceptionally strong, surface-
based, super-refractive layer that is deeper than the normal
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evaporative duct. This occurs when strong subsiding flows
of desert-dried or continental air flows across the coast
and out over large bodies of water. Examples of such winds
are sometimes dust laden khamsin winds of the eastern Medi-
terranean and the Mid-East and the often hot, dry Santa Ana
winds of Southern California. In other parts of the world
similar dry winds are known by such names as the bora near
the Adriatic coast, the mistral along the southern French
coast on the Mediterranean and the sirocco which blows
across the North African coast. In all cases, very dry air
flows out over the water for various distances causing great
humidity decreases with height and sometimes sharp temperature
inversions in the very low layers.
"These conditions — which produce gaping radar holes
for surface-to-air searches and strong ducts and extended
range for surface-to-surface searches — can present one of
the most confusing radar coverage situations. While these
dry winds lead to the most exceptional cases, it may be
generally stated that any condition that results in a mass
of dry air overlaying a moisture-ladden layer results in a
strong super-refractive condition, with or without appreciable
winds
.
"In tropical and warm-water regions the absolute moisture
content of the air is generally so high that relatively
subtle changes in humidity are often sufficient to cause
large changes. . .over very short distances. These may occur
throughout the lower and midlevels of the atmosphere or
very close to the surface, thus posing problems to both
shipboard and airborne radar systems. It may be that such
subtle and randomly spaced humidity and temperature gradients
near the ocean surface are partially responsible for the
ghosts and anomalous targets occasionally seen by radar.
"Over the warm waters in the northern Sea of Japan during
cold, clear, low wind or calm nights, rising bubbles of warm
moist air called thermals have been blamed as the cause of
irregularities on the shape of the moon as observed visually
from shipboard. On these same nights, the radars were also
plagued by ghosts. Similar situations have been observed
in the Mediterranean, in the North Sea, and off New England...'
"Moreover, some ghostly calls to general quarters can
be attributed to birds. It is known that migratory waves
of hundreds of birds returning to their roosts in harbors
around the world can sometimes produce alarming radar
returns
.
"But there is still another important possible explana-
tion of ghosts... the atmosphere does not really resemble the
simplistic picture we want to assign to it. For instance,
it is nearly always assumed in operational applications
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that elevated inversions and super-refractive layers are
flat and horizontally stratified. Yet, because of topo-
graphic features like islands and mountainous coastlines and
numerous gravity wave-like disturbances in the atmosphere
(which are very difficult to detect), the elevated layers
are often wave-like and may exhibit height changes of hun-
dreds of feet within distances of a few tens of miles or
less. These waves, depending on their origin and the direc-
tion of the wind flow above and below, may move in any
direction at various speeds and may exert a' greater influence
on propagation than the variations caused by large scale
weather features, especially during stable, persistent
periods or seasons.
"To the radarman watching his scope, bright blips may
seem to approach his ship at high speed and, as quickly,
disappear. Very subtle changes in the place and angle
where the radar beam impinges upon the elevated super-
refractive layer as it meanders in the wind flow may cause
the returning signal to appear to jump, and may explain the
sometimes unrealistically high speeds of these returns...
To operational commanders in combat situations, the appearance
of false targets closing in is no less alarming than real
ones .
"With such pronounced effects on radars possible owing
to refractive anomalies and layers in the atmosphere, it is
natural to wonder how frequently these atmospheric conditions
may be expected to occur. Unfortunately, there is little
climatological information of this sort available and there
is no known tabulation on the frequency of ghosts. There
are, however, significant bits of data on refractive layers
and ducting. Past reports by the APL (Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Applied Physics Laboratory) have suggested that surface
evaporative ducts occur approximately S0% to 90% of the time
over subtropical and tropical oceans, especially in summer.
Past reports from the NELC (Naval Electronics Laboratory
Center) have estimated that surface trapping for X-band
radars in the Near East and Southeast Asia because of the
evaporative duct may occur 85% to 90$ of the time.
"According to the APL reports, in colder climates, such
as the North Sea, X-band ducting by evaporative ducts has
been estimated to occur from k0% of the time in winter to
90% of the time in summer. Only in polar regions are ducts
apparently infrequent, probably because of the very low duct
heights and quite low values of absolute humidity despite
the fact that evaporation rates are frequently high, particu-
larly near the Siberian coastline. Current NELC efforts
appear to point in general to a wide geographical and
seasonal variation of this oceanic evaporative phenomenon.
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"As for elevated trapping layers and ducts, apparently
these, too, vary widely but can be very persistent in cer-
tain places of the world. Pacific Missile Range data taken
at Point Magu in coastal Southern California indicate that
elevated trapping layers could occur over 9'0£ of the time
in summer and well over 505? of the time in winter in that
area. It is likely that similar high percentages will be
found to occur over the Mediterranean also.
In the absence of refractive forecasts, meaningful
conclusions about the likelihood of encountering anomalous
propagation of radar energy can be developed by applying
several simple thumb rules. Expect strong super-refractive
layers to:
1. "Coincide with temperature inversions.
2. "Be present just above the tops of extensive decks
of stratus or strocumulus clouds.
3. "Occur during warm, dry conditions over an open sea."
"In places such as the Mediterranean, the presence of
cloudless skies, light surface winds and reports of warm
dry air and high pressure extending over the operating area
can be taken as forewarning of possible raciar problems due
to refraction. Over the eastern North Pacific Ocean, the
presence of persistent stratus or statocurmnlus cover should
be sufficient evidence of strong super-refractive conditions
just above cloud tops in that region. Dry winds like the
Santa Ana of Southern California and the Khamsin of the
Eastern Mediterranean blowing over an oceanic surface are
the atmosphere's warning of extreme super-refractive condi-
tions at very low levels. And wherever strong low-level
refractive layers and topographic obstacles to the wind flow
appear together, mysterious ghosts might be anticipated."
3. Visibility vs. Detectability
Even with the most favorable environmental conditions
a target will not be "seen" unless the signal presented
on the operator's scope exceeds a certain detectability
threshold. To be detectable the signal must first exceed




"A visibility threshold refers to the signal voltage
of a pip which can just be seen when the observer knows
precisely at which part of the radar display to expect its
appearance, e.g. he may be told to watch for a pip inside
a quarter-inch square drawn on the scope. No visual search
is involved. A detectability threshold, on the other hand,
involves the factor of visual search: the observer is
informed that the pip may appear anywhere on the scope. As
would be expected, visibility thresholds are lower than




A request from the shipboard Electronics Technician
to "Take a ringtime" (Radarman, 1969) conjures up in the
minds of many some thought that by so doing we are insured,
at least for a short while, that the radar is optimally
adjusted and that the operator is being presented with the
best possible display the set is capable of providing. This
thought is erroneous; worse yet, most repeaters are incor-
rectly adjusted by the operator himself with a resultant
signal loss of as much as 20 dB from incorrect brightness
(Baker, 1962), and another ±lh dB from incorrect focus
(Williams, 1949).
For specific radar's, the applicable Operating Pro-
cedures Technical Manual may provide adequate information
so that the optimum detectible signal at the scope face can
be obtained. Such procedures should be adopted. Scope
brightness is adjusted by rotating the intensity or brilliance
control (CRT Bias Adjust) on a radar console — operational
radar scopes are often set at a brightness which renders the
sweepline just visible. In some cases a penalty of 20 dB
is paid by operating at visual reference, and this results
in a range loss of l\0% . On a circular cathode ray tube (CRT),
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this amounts to about 65% of possible radar coverage (Thorn-
ton, 1956). There is a gradient of scope brightness in the
radial dimension on a CRT: brightness is highest near center
and decreases at the periphery. Because of this, optimum
brightness should be made with reference to that radial
position which is of greatest importance — in the case of
early warning radar for example optimum brightness should be
set near the periphery of the scope. Whenever the range
scale is changed, scope brightness changes, and should be
reset to restore optimum brightness. The optimum level also
changes with age of the CRT. Noise level is also related to
the optimum brightness level. For example, increasing bias
to adjust brightness adds to the size and number of noise
spots, which in turn adds to scope brightness. If noise
level changes, this will change brightness levels. In some
cases target detectability might actually be improved by
increasing the noise background (Baker, 1962). The following
procedure, from Baker, while applicable to a specific radar
equipment, illustrates quite well the care that must be
taken to obtain optimum noise and bias (brightness) levels
in an operational environment. It may be obvious why the
less effective but simpler visual reference setting has so
many proponents.
"DEMONSTRATING OPTIMUM SCOPE BRIGHTNESS
"The phenomenon of optimum scope brightness is simple to
demonstrate in any setting where a pip is just visible on
a scope of optimum brightness. By simply rotating the
brilliance control so as to achieve a darker scope the




"SETTING OPTIMUM SCOPE BRIGHTNESS
"One manual of operational radar procedures on our desk
states, under Adjustment of Controls, that "the PPI should
be adjusted to the most sensitive setting for detection at
maximum range". Apparently this adjustment is a matter of
operator opinion and it is simple to demonstrate that there
are as many opinions as there are operators. Williams and
King (19^6) cite operator instructions which, while being
quite specific, are wrong: "Adjust intensity until the
sweep trace is just visible on the scope, when the IF gain
is set at minimum"
.
"What is needed is a technique for setting optimum brightness
which (a) is accurate, (b) results in the same settings
being made over long periods of time by the same operator,
(c) results in the same setting being made by different
operators, and (d) is simple to use. Obviously one could
employ a voltmeter, if one knew the grid voltage appropriate
for each individual CRT and how it changed with age. A
photometer might be used if the correct brightness values
were known. One might also use a target generator to gen-
erate a standard pip which was visible only when optimum
scope brightness prevailed. These are not simple solutions.
"An acceptable technique has been demonstrated by Machen
et al. (1956). The human eye is not a reliable device for
estimating absolute brightness, but it is remarkably pre-
cise when making threshold judgments. Advantage is taken of
this fact by placing a glass filter of neutral density,
H inches square, over a portion of the scope and having
operators adjust scope brightness until the sweep-line is
just visible through the filter. This they can do within
+/- ,5V of grid bias. The filter is then removed and the
scope is at optimum brightness. The theoretical density for
such a filter is 3-15. For practical purposes any filter
having a density from 3-0 to 3.3 is adequate. These charac-
teristics for an appropriate filter were first determined
for CRTs having a P7 phosphor (yellow with blue flash) . It
is now known (Smith and Boyes, 1957) that the same filter
density is correct for a P19 magnesium fluoride screen
(red-orange) . The filter technique can be used also for
setting the correct noise level, as described in the next
section.
"PROCEDURE FOR SETTING NOISE AND BRIGHTNESS WITH FILTERS
"The following detailed procedure has been described by Smith
(1956) for FPS-3 radar equipment, which is commonly employed
in an early-warning role. It is not known whether modifica-
tion of this procedure would be necessary for other equipments.
"A. To Adjust Noise Level
1. With no filter in place and with video and all other
sources of noise switched off, adjust brightness
until the sweep-line is just visible.
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2. Place a neutral filter (1jx4 in) of density 4.0
(mounted in a convenient mask if desired) over
the tube face. Turn the video on, and increase
the video gain until the noisy sweep-line, i.e.
that portion beyond local clutter and away from
permanent echoes, is just visible through the
filter.
3. Leave video gain control in this position.
"B. To Adjust Optimal Bias (always after adjusting noise
level)
1. Replace the filter mentioned above with one of
density 3-0 to 3-3.
2. With video switch off, but gain control still at
the setting determined in A, adjust brightness
until the noise-free sweep-line is just visible
through the filter. Leave the brightness control
at this setting.
3. Remove filter and turn on the necessary operating
switches.
"Unless major changes in range, etc., take place, no
further adjustment to the brightness or gain control should
be made.
"In the absence of a filter for setting the noise level
it is recommended that optimum screen brightness be set with
a filter of density 3.0, with no noise. Video can then be
turned on full.
"OPERATIONAL TESTS USING OPTIMUM SCOPE BRIGHTNESS
"Bessey and Machen (1957) performed an experiment in an
operational radar station, using normal air traffic. In
one room — the bright room — (illumination of 0.1 ft-c
at the scope face), scope brightness was optimum. The
other room — the dark room - scope brightness was at
visual reference. The results follow:
"1. 19.2 per cent more plots were recorded in the
bright room than in the dark room. The probability of this
difference occuring by chance is less than one in 1,000.
"2. Tracks 20 miles or more in length were analyzed.
There were 70 of these. All 70 were recorded in the bright
room. In the dark room three were never recorded, 10 were
recorded as one plot only, and 18 were tracked for less than
20 miles.
"3. Concerning earliness of initial detection, the
bright room was superior to the darm room on 50 tracks, the
same on 19, and inferior on one.
"4. In the bright room targets were tracked further in
^3 cases, the same distance on 26, and less on one.
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"5. Continuity of tracking (fewer gaps) was superior
in the bright room in 13 cases, and the same in 57 cases.
"6. The advantage in earliness of "early warning" was
computed to average 3^ miles in favour of the bright room."
Three-inch neutral density gelatin square filters are avail-
able in camera stores, and can be used to obtain optimal
noise level and brightness adjustments in a manner similar
to that described. Where the exact filter density required
is not available, it is a simple matter to "build" the
proper filter. Filters of .1, .2, and 3.0 can be sandwiched
for instance to obtain a 3-3 filter.
There are additional variables which will be men-
tioned briefly. Gain : Smith and Hunt (1957) > using opera-
tional equipment, found that "In general, the higher the
gain — and hence the noise level — the better is target
visibility at all CRT biases." Focus : Williams (19*19)
found that with a dim scope, operated at visual reference,
extreme defocusing resulted in a loss of only one dB in the
visibility threshold. At optimum brightness, however, the
loss was 10J$ dB, while at extreme brightness the loss was
17*5 dB. He also demonstrated that the "best focus" set by
an operator yielded thresholds which were within 1 dB of
those obtained with the focus which actually was best In
terms of visibility, at any scope brightness.
5. Ambient Illumination for Scope Visibility (Generally
from Baker, 1962)
As a general rule, some light in a radar room would
be beneficial if minimum target visibility thresholds are
desired — the brighter the scope the greater the amount of
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ambient Illumination needed. Ambient illumination levels
about equal to that of the eye's central field (angle within
about one degree of fixation point) give an advantage over
total darkness of about h dB. As illumination increases,
the scope will tend to be "washed out," and visibility
diminishes rapidly. At moderate and high levels of illumin-
ation, blue permits target visibility thresholds significantly
superior to that of other colors; at lower illumination
levels the difference is less significant. Under blue
illumination, the maximum target visibility threshold occurs
at a low level (.1 foot-candle), and is slightly less at
levels either greater or less than this value.
6. Optimal Eye Scan
The final element necessary for target detection is
a successful search by the radar operator. If the operator
searches inefficiently or incompletely, needless system
degradation will occur. The Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS)
may unfortunately reinforce inefficient or careless operator
search, since the omissions of one operator can be compensated
for by the satisfactory or overlapping performance of another
(Lockee, 1969). Even with NTDS, though, we are often re-
quired to search without backup: the surface search console
operator often functions alone, and during times of low air
activity a single air search console might be manned. Any
person searching a cathode ray tube for information — the
00D, sonarman, ECM Operator, and others, might do so more
effectively with an understanding of the basic principles
45

of search presented here. This discussion is directly
applicable to the planning position indicator (PPI) display
most commonly found aboard ship.
Development of a satisfactory technique for monitoring
individual eye scan patterns has made it possible to study
visual search characteristics under conditions approaching
those found in the real world. This technique is electro-
oculography (EOG), and one of the earliest applied studies
using this procedure was conducted by White & Ford (1960a).
Findings indicate that during search, the operator tends to
follow along behind the scan-line by means of closely spaced
fixations, with the pattern being randomly interrupted by
jumps of varying magnitude in and out along the scan line.
During the time between these jumps, he tends to remain
focused on about the middle of the scan line, regardless
of the size of the display. The distribution of the jumps
is fairly symmetrical with the outward jumps occurring about
as often as the inward jumps, and covering the same average
radial distance. The average fixation time is .37 seconds.
We will see (In Section V.) that under normal vision, percep-
tion is sharpest at the point of fixation. Craik and Mac-
pherson (19^5) determined that for a radar return, the
visibility threshold deteriorates linearly by about 5 dB,
as the angular distance of pip from fixation point increases
from zero degrees to 15 degrees. Beyond 15 degrees, the
rate of deterioration increases rapidly. The net effect
of these two phenomenon is to confine our area of effective
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search at or near half-range, and to effectively exclude
those areas near the periphery or sweep-line origin from
search. Baker (1962) hypothesizes that the consequences of
this basically back-and-forth search technique apply in
searching a horizon for ships or in searching a microscope
field. As an example of a practical situation where a
conscientious effort is made to overcome this inefficiency,
he cites the case of students being taught to study X-ray
photographs who are exhorted to "pay attention to the outside,
the center will take care of itself."
Other studies (Wallis and Samuel, 1961; Colquhoun,
1961) confirm this basically circular search pattern with
the tendency to view the inner portion of the display more
closely than appropriate. Other generalizations are fre-
quently made in laboratory studies such as: (1) "There was
a considerable amount of time spent looking away from the
display," or (2) "As the operator becomes tired his fixation
rate slows, and he begins to stare for longer and longer
periods at the center of the scope, or some irrelevant
aspect of the display," or (3) "Operators will be unlikely to
cope effectively if there are as many as 10 contacts to be
watched simultaneously on the display," or (4) "Some amount
of irrelevant information such as old targets, jamming, or
clutter is beneficial and helps to maintain operator alert-
ness during continuous activity." Often, two or more of
these generalizations may be drawn from the same study. Less




1. During actual watchkeeping sessions, the differences
between operators in their ability to detect targets may be
partly attributable to differences in ability to search the
display effectively, rather than to differences in general
alertness or vigilance (Wallis and Samuel, 1961).
2. To date, attempts to improve target detection pro-
ficiencies under laboratory simulations by providing special
training, using groups of experienced radar operators, or
practice, have been disappointing (Wright, Frederickson, and
Claflin, 1964). Baker (1962) cited a large body of available
data on selection and training of radar operators and con-
cluded: "Although I consider this research area a valid
academic exercise, the practical rewards to date are
disappointing.
"
It can be observed that the special training technique in
the Wright, Frederickson, and Claflin experiment did not
include instructions on scanning techniques, and this may
have been critical.
In theory, uniform distribution of search over the
radius of the display can be obtained by continually sweeping
your eyes along behind the rotating scan-line, in a consis-
tent direction (for example, from the center of the scope to
the periphery). Although this technique might have a cer-
tain practical appeal, the result would be to concentrate
the search at the center of the scope since the area searched
is a function of the radius squared. In some situations,
this type of search might be desired. A regular back-and-
forth sweep behind the scan line concentrates the fixations
and the search at about mid-range. If concentration at a
particular range is desired, this could be achieved by
inscribing a reference circle at that range (with grease-
pencil for example) for the eyes to return to between fixa-
tions and a back-and-forth sweep behind the scan-line. To
H8

improve early warning performance, the central portion of the
radar could be masked out; or the operator may be able to
concentrate his attention at the end point of the rotating
scan-line once he is aware of the phenomenon of peripheral
blindness and its causes. In operational situations such
concentration probably does occur in principle, since the
operator will tend to favor an area or direction in which
new contacts are most likely. The presence on the scope
display of land, other forces involved in the radar search,
and "areas of interest" complicates the operators usual
scan pattern. Further, the operator has some feeling about
where the next target is likely to appear (the appearance
of a contact at any point on the display with uniform
probability is a creation of the laboratory and not of
nature) and this too modifies his sweep pattern. Baker
(1958), by masking parts of a radar display, has demonstrated
that with operator concentration deliberately focused on a
particular part of the display, detection performance in
that area can be improved.
7 . Conclusion
The conclusions from these various studies show that
the visual search technique of the radar operator is an
important element in overall radar system performance. The
operator can conscientiously control his scan pattern to a
great degree (Nicely and Miller, 1957), and he can devise
temporary lines or overlays to assist him in obtaining
efficient scan. The more information he has about where to
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look, the better he can tailor his search to the task. This
does require premeditation: thought about how the eyes
should be moved, and then concentration in carrying out the
plan. Moving the eyes like a broom, to keep dust or falling
rain from a certain area, might be a useful visualization to
help in achieving a more "patterned search." A "random
search" consistently favors particular portions of the dis-..
play to the exclusion of others, and the greater the operator's
fatigue the more extreme the bias. To search effectively
requires a master plan — this is as true in the case of a
radar operator sitting at his console as it is of the ship





"The combination of a highly specialized hardware
subsystem results in an ASW system with performance
limited not by hardware capabilities but the human
understanding of those capabilities."
Lt . R.L. Brandenburg
(Brandenburg, 1964)
"Significant improvement in ASW readiness and
systems performance is achievable if we are willing
to make an investment in the upgrading of the human
element in these systems."
Robert R. Mackie
(Mackie, 1972)
The case for training, improved individual qualification,
minimum performance standards, and better design has been
eloquently pleaded through numerous forums. The basic
premise of these arguments is that improvement in surface
ship ASW performance is urgently needed, and once this "fact"
is established a thesis is developed which recommends certain
actions to reach that objective. Some unmentioned cost is
associated with each of these actions, but this cost is
either ignored or assumed to be less than the benefit.
While improving surface ship ASW readiness has a certain
patriotic quality, it may just be that from the standpoint of
this nation's overall broad national objectives and commit-
ments the additional dollar spent for surface ASW will not
buy us as much as the same dollar spent elsewhere. If "no
cost" performance gains are sought, then we must concentrate




"Sonarmen don't have the ears they used to!"
Anonymous Member
Ship's ASW Attack Team
Condition IAS
Maybe so, but they don't have the equipment they used to
have, either. Not only must the sonar operator's auditory
threshold be low enough to perceive the "faint echo," but
once the engagement is joined he is expected to report
changes in pitch caused by the target's motion in the line-
of-sound (LOS) relative to the surrounding reverberating
medium. Old sonar texts, and obsolete fleet school doctrines
often emphasize the importance of combining doppler infor-
mation from the sonar operator with other fire control and
CIC solutions to "solve" the attack problem. Not emphasized
is that with today's low frequency sonars, doppler shifts
simply can not be detected by audio means.
Sonar Operating Target Speed in LOS
Frequency (KHz.) required for 100 Hz.
doppler shift
30 KHz. 5 Kt.
5 KHz. 30 Kt.
3.5 KHz. 42.8 Kt.
For a given target speed in the LOS, the magnitude of the
doppler shift is inversely proportional to the operating
frequency of the sonar (Urick, 1967). As the data above
dramatically Illustrates, doppler discrimination with older,
higher frequency, sonars is greatly facilitated. The 100 Hz
doppler shift is an arbitrarily chosen value, but target
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doppler shift and target speed in LOS are directly propor-
tional so that other relationships can be formed easily.
Actual sonar operators have been found to be 95 per cent
accurate in perceiving doppler shifts of 25 Hz., and 50 per
cent accurate for ten Hz. shifts (O'Hanlon, Schmidt, and
Baker, 1966). The problem of doppler discrimination is
actually most acute with slightly older sonar systems —
the most modern electronically determine doppler, and the
"discrimination" required by the operator consists of
reading a value from the face of a meter. Unfortunately,
the large majority of operational systems today do not have
this feature; and in a scene re-enacted all too frequently,
the sonar operator is required to make a report which is at
best meaningless (i.e., "no doppler"), and at worst no more
than a guess (i.e., "up", or "down" doppler). More often
than not, this report will be based on target aspect and
relative motion as determined by the operator from the face
of the scope with a grease-pencil, and unless this fact is
known to Command or the 00D, the report can be highly mis-
leading. This rather lengthy preamble introduces a factor
which is pre-eminent in the mind of the sonar watchstander
.
C. FALSE CONTACTS AND MOTIVATION
The sonarman wants to do a good job as an individual,
and as a member of a select group he wants to establish
himself as professionally competent. Not an easy task for
a sonarman, especially when performance has such low visi-
bility. 99.9 Per cent of the time he is on watch, he has
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nothing to report. Often his sole opportunity for recogni-
tion, and his reputation, are based on what he does (or does
not do) during the other .1 per cent of the time. If during
this brief moment of recognition he's asked for "doppler,"
he'll find a way to report it. Similarly, if he senses
disappointment or disapproval when he makes a report which
is later determined to be a "false contact," it is certain
that the next time he will not make the report quite as
soon. For him, the penalty for making a false report is
often greater than that received for failing to detect a
true contact.
The choice the operator makes between avoidance of a
false contact and the possibility of failing to detect a
true contact has been variously investigated, and results
support the contention that detection performance can be
regarded as a decision task (Evans, 1965). Weiner (1962;
1963; 196^, a) in a long series of experiments extending over
several years investigated the factor of "cost" in the response
of individuals to various signals. Weiner found that by
awarding "points" as a reinforcement for correct responses,
or by deducting points for errors, he could manipulate
observed operator performance in vigilance tasks. Broadbent
and Gregory (1963) performed a number of experiments in
which subjects kept watch during long periods for inconspic-
uous signals. They found that detection responses
"are quite inconsistent with the concept that stimuli are
either definitely perceived or definitely fail to be detected,
with no intermediate category. The results are more consistent
5^

with a model of perception as the outcome of a statistical
decision made with more or less caution ..."
Colquhoun (1967) in a vigilance task which simulated sonar
target detection compared performance for operators instructed
to report only targets they were sure of (SURE) with perfor-
mance in later sessions where they were instructed to report
any signal-like sound (UNSURE). Colquhoun found:
"a substantially higher percentage of both "weak" and
"strong" signals was detected with the UNSURE procedure.
False report rate was also higher with the UNSURE procedure,
but analysis showed that this reflected a change in decision
criterion rather than in discrimination efficiency."-
By varying the operator's risk and reward factors, various
performance levels can be achieved. Even requiring him to
keep a written log of his detections increases his conserva-
tism: "he makes fewer false reports but, on the other hand,
he misses more signals or allows them to persist longer
before reporting them." (Howland, 1958). In fact, if the
operator is told: "Never make a false contact," (i.e.,
probability of false detection will be 0) he will accomplish
this by never reporting any contact and theoretically the
detection probability of the system will necessarily drop
to 0. The positive effect of rewards on performance has
often been confirmed by experiment (Yufer, 1969; Smith,
Lucaccini, and Epstein, 1967). Typical rewards include
"points," "praise," or more tangibly early release from
watch or money. In one famous instance at the height of the
Cold War, a case of Johnny Walker Elack Label Scotch was
offered to the first ship that could detect and track a
soviet submarine until she "surfaced." Apparently such
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rewards tend to make the operator less risk-adverse, and
increases in both actual target and false target detections
should result.
D. RECEIVER OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS (ROC) CURVES
Empirical curves can be constructed for detection systems
that illustrate the relationship between actual and false tar-
get detections. These curves can also be determined
theoretically, and are valid for particular equipments
detecting a steady signal, in a completely random noise
background (Urick and Gaunaurd, 1972). An example of one
such theoretical receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
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Varying the risk and reward factors change the point
that we operate at on a particular ROC curve, but this does
not change the shape of the curve (i.e., we might improve
probability of detection, but our operating point simply
slides up along the curve and we find that our probability
of false contact is also greater) . To change the shape of
the ROC curve (to obtain a greater probability of detection
with the same false alarm rate, or to obtain a lower false
alarm rate with the same probability of detection), we must
change the detection system itself (in practice, reward
probably does increase vigilance and motivation, thereby
changing the system and shape of the ROC curve). One method
of changing the system involves improving operator perfor-
mance through a technique known as "pairing."
E. PAIRING (MULTIPLE WATCHSTANDERS)
Pairing is using more than one observer, and in one of
the earliest experiments studying detection improvements
achieved by pairing, Schafer (1949) found significant im-
provements with multiple operators, but found "there is
little to be gained by adding more than 2 extra observers."
In a later experiment Morgan and Alluisi (1965) found that
the paired operators were operationally "independent," and
that the theoretical maximum increase in detection could be
achieved. That is, if the probability of target detection
for one operator has the value of .1, then by using two
operators in the same situation the probability of detection
increases to .19, three operators to .271. For illustration,
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other values are shown below where the probability of
detection by one operator is .5 and .9.





Independence certainly doesn't exist in the usual case,
and other experiments conducted under different conditions
have achieved less than the theoretical maximum gains
(Bergum and Lehr, 1962,a; Ware , Baker, and Drucker, 1964).
Under no conditions has the effect of pairing been adverse.
Even where no clear improvement in detection probability
is achieved, the mechanism of team consensus feedback
(discussed later in this Section) will provide measurable
training benefits. In that pairing requires additional
watchstanders, it is not a condition which could be main-
tained indefinitely. However, when it is important to have
absolutely the highest probability of detection possible
over a rather short period of time, then pairing is rational.
Baker (1962) cautions that
"no advantage of multiple operation can be expected unless
each operator searches actively and continuously. The
writer, and probably the reader, is familiar with situations
where doubling the number of operators results in halving
the amount of work each does, by Informal agreement between
operators, i.e. "Today I'll watch and you read." Team






In spite of a paucity of submarine target services,
there seems to be no lack of experimental data upon which
to base a few recommendations for improving shipboard sonar
performance. Some of the more significant experimental
findings related to the human factor in anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) are listed below. Items 1-8 are from Baker
and Harabedian (1962) and based on that organizations
experiments with actual sonar operators and shipboard signal
generating and processing equipment.
1. "In a situation such that virtually all targets were
detectable when the operator knew when and where to look,
about 13 per cent fewer were detected when a target was
known to be imminent, but had to be searched for.
2. "In a watchstanding situation lasting *J5 minutes,
when the operators knew neither when nor where a target
would appear, some 20 per cent fewer targets were detected
than when they knew that a target was imminent.
3. "When, at the end of a watchstanding session lasting
^5 minutes, the operators were again alerted to the imminent
appearance of targets, there was improvement in the efficien-
cy with which they detected subsequent targets, but the
improvement was not to that level of efficiency obtaining
just prior to the watchstanding session: some "fatigue"
is inferred.
4. "The decrement in detection performance during
watchstanding sessions occurred and was complete within the
first few minutes on watch.
5. "Efficiency of detection performance under conditions
in which the operators were alerted to the imminent appear-
ance of a target, was moderately indicative of that during
a watchstanding session lasting ^5 minutes. This finding
suggests the possibility of a selection test for sonar
operators (utilizing shipboard test set).
6. "With respect to consistency of target detection
performance, operators were found to perform rather consis-
tently within a watch, but not from one day to the next,
nor from one experimental condition to the other. They were
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consistent from day to day, and from condition to condition,
however, in the frequency with which they made false reports
of targets.
7. "Efficiency of detection performance was not related
to target bearing, but was related to target range. Detec-
tion efficiency was superior for targets located near half-
radius on the visual display.
8. "Efficiency in the detection of sonar targets was
not found to be related to criteria of ASW school achievement
or to scores on selected aptitude tests."
Mackie (1964) summarized the results of six years of
research on human factor problems in ASW. While the specific
document is classified, the general results were:
9. An average vigilance decrement (loss) of about 20
per cent occurs in the first few minutes of a sonar watch.
The less frequently signals appear during the watch, the
more severe the total vigilance decrement; when signal rates
on a visual display are low, a variety of auditory stimuli
reduces the vigilance decrement. The audio decrement over
time appears to be less than the visual decrement.
10. The introduction of artificial signals increases
the probability of detecting infrequent real signals. The
level of vigilance maintained by the operator is also a
function of environmental stimulation from sources other
than the detection displays. If the extra stimulation is
not actually distracting, the added "arousal" it provides
serves to facilitate vigilance.
11. Immediate knowledge of how well he is doing reduces
the operator's vigilance decrement.
12. Operators expecting long intervals between signals
are particularly prone to missing signals that occur soon
after one that has been detected.
13. Vigilance decrements are less severe in complex
monitoring situations than in simple ones although the
absolute level of performance may be lower for the complex
display
.
m. Detection performance on redundant auditory and
visual displays is superior to that on either display used
alone. Operators monitoring more than one display are
inclined to attend selectively to the display having the
more easily recognizable signals. If the displays are not
redundant, this can adversely affect detection probability.
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15. Performance on vigilance tasks is not reliably
predicted from scores on conventional psychological tests
of aptitude, temperament or motivation. Traditional
sensory threshold measures are only slightly predictive of
vigilance performance.
16. Baker, C.H., Parker, and Rittger (1964) found that
"by increasing the gain (actually decreasing the gain voltage
by 3-3 volts) above that selected by operators of an AN/SQS-
23A sonar operating at sea, target detection performance
with respect to targets generated by the sonar test set
was improved by 3 decibels."
17. Horton (1957): "Over a wide range of conditions it
is safe to assume that the reduction in signal differential
responsible for a reduction in the probability of successful
observation from 90 per cent to 10 per cent will be in the
neighborhood of 4 dB."
18. Neal (1967) determined that for an auditory vigilance
task, pretask instructions can have a significant positive
effect on the monitor's performance, at least in the short
run.
19. Motowidlo, Loehr, and Dunnette (1972) investigated
the relationship between an individuals work performance
and the nature of the goals that are set. "When it is feasi-
ble to set specific goals, the goals should be set (by taking
prior performance, ability and other "trait" factors into
account) so that individuals' expectancies of success are
high, and the work setting should provide feedback cues to
confirm for them that they are indeed approaching their
goals successfully. When, however, it is not feasible to
set specific goals, the "management" of motivated perfor-
mance may be considerably more complicated. Without specific
goals, individuals apparently will perform best when they
are somehow made to believe that goal attainment is neither
too easy nor too difficult but somewhere in between. As
should be apparent, performance toward specific goals may
take greater advantage of individuals' expectancies based
on their own prior performances, abilities, skills and other
trait variables. In contrast, performance toward ambiguous
goals will usually need to rely more heavily on situational
variables and particular aspects of the work setting to
develop the middle levels of state based expectancies likely
to yield highest performance."
20. O'Hanlon, Schmidt, and Baker (1966) found no impair-
ment in the ability of a sonar operator to discriminate
doppler after listening to sonar returns for 90 minutes.
21. Bergum and Lehr (1963) studying the relationship
between vigilance performance in a monitoring task and the
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presence of superiors, found that a random visiting schedule
by either a commissioned or noncommissioned officer greatly
facilitated detection performance.
22. Wise (1967) studied the adverse effect of transfers,
discharges, leave periods, and school assignments on ASW
team performance. The percentage of valid detections, local-
izations, and attacks that the squadron averaged during both
periods of enforced crew stability and normal crew turnover
were recorded, compared, and statistically analyzed. The
findings revealed significant differences across all phases.
The conclusions were "that under conditions of typical crew
turnover, the operational performance of the aircrew is
significantly impaired, and that aircrew instability produces
less valid detections, localizations, and attacks, as well
as greater operator error, than occurs under conditions of
enforced crew stability."
23. Baker, C.H. (1963) investigated sonar operator
settings of bias and gain, and found that "sonar operators
do not operate their displays at optimum values of bias and
gain. Operation at optimum values of bias and gain should
result in substantial improvements in detection performance."
This study recommended several practical methods for setting
optimum values. One method involved making a visual thres-
hold determination of CRT brightness through an optical
filter as was done in Section III. The second involved the
use of the installed sonar test set and recommended making
adjustments to maximize target thresholds. (A third method
which may be applicable in some cases involves the use of
a voltmeter to set optimum values as determined from correction
factors to be applied as the CRT ages.)
2k. Cockrell and Sadacca (1971) conducted a series of
experiments over several years to develop and test the team
consensus feedback method as a technique for maintaining and
enhancing the proficiency of individuals in detection and
classification vigilance tasks. The essential feature of
the method is that individuals practice in teams, arriving
at decisions with regard to target detection and identifica-
tion by a consensus of the team members. The only feedback
which the individuals receive with regard to the accuracy
of their decisions they provide for themselves during team
discussion and comparison. "The general conclusion from the
four experiments is that the team consensus feedback is an
effective method for maintaining and improving ... proficien-
cy. Although precise feedback leads to greater learning,
precise feedback is seldom available, especially In field
situations.
"Overall results for the four experiments indicate
that team consensus feedback practice leads to greater
learning than individual practice in target detection and
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identification. The method has been shown to be most effec-
tive in increasing identification proficiency. The team
consensus feedback method was also effective in reducing
number of false targets reported. Only with the most effec-
tive team procedures (Experiment IV, mentioned below)
was there a significant increase in number of targets
correctly detected.
"Team composition in terms of proficiency seems
highly important in the team consensus feedback procedure.
Where teams are heterogeneous in proficiency, learning is
substantially greater than where teams are homogeneous in
proficiency. This fact seems to indicate that team members
learn more from each other, and unless at least one member
of the team is more proficient than the others, very little
learning will occur. This conclusion was clearly borne
out in Experiment IV where the highly proficient (individuals)
in the team practice groups learned only -a small amount
more than the control (individuals), whereas the (individuals)
of medium and low proficiency learned much more than the
control (individuals).
"The ideal procedure seems to be to have three-man
teams whose members are heterogeneous in proficiency using
the immediate consensus work procedure.- In this procedure,
all (individuals) first perform initial (classification) on
an individual basis and then get together to decide on the
team (classification) . The crucial factors seem to be the
individualized initial (classification) and the opportunity
for immediate feedback through comparison of responses and
discussion with teammates."
G. ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS
In many cases the findings above clearly suggest the
optimum action. For other Items some additional inferrences
might be drawn and are listed below (numbers in parenthesis
refer to the items above which tend to be supportive):
1. Since the decrement over time is greater for detec-
ting rare targets than for detecting frequent ones, perfor-
mance may be improved by increasing the number of targets
which the operator must detect (9), and by introducing the
powerful motivating force that a knowledge of results pro-
vides (Section VII; Baker, 1960a; Fltts and Posner, 1967).
Because of the inherent limitations of most sonar target
generators, due mostly to the inability to generate a signal
of sufficient realism (Mackie and Harabedian, 1964), a very
useful procedure would be to require the sonar operators to
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report all real targets acquired — surface ships and bio-
logics alike. In spite of "doctrine" which requires such
reports, the usual procedure is for the operator to track a
contact for some time, and to obtain an informal report from
CIC regarding the presence or absence of surface shipping,
before he even considers making a report. If CIC or the
lookout can add that the operator's contact is a surface ship,
then often no report is made or even logged. An effort to
foster an atmosphere where reports from sonar are not only
desired, but encouraged, would be extremely beneficial.
A side effect that the ship will realize from fuller integra-
tion of the sonar operator into the ship's usual detection
"triangle" (Lookout, CIC, 00D) will be that under conditions
of reduced visibility, contact information from sonar can
be extremely helpful (sonar alone can immediately determine
if a particular ship is underway or anchored). Under some
circumstances such as periods of electronic silence or radar
failure, sonar ranges might be the best information available
for maneuvering purposes. Like reduced visibility plotting,
unless the techniques are practiced under conditions where
they might not really be necessary, they wen't function well
when they are vital.
2. Closely related to the benefits accrued through
increasing target density is that obtained, through intro-
ducing secondary or irrelevant stimulation- Typical experi-
ments require the operator to be alert for some signal or
change in a condition not related to his primary vigilance
task, and are able to demonstrate that performance at the
primary task is thereby enhanced (10; cf., Baker, 1966;
Catalano, 1967; McGrath, I960, 1965)
-
"The general conclusion ... is thatt knowledge that
signals on a peripheral vigilance task will definitely occur
is a factor which, at least early in a task, results in
superior performance on a central vigilance task. When the
peripheral signals do begin to occur, the high level of
performance on the central task is maintained by knowledge
of results about performance on a peripheral task."
"Initial activation level is achieved by the Impact
of the relatively new stimulation in the task situation
together with the subjects internal state as a function of
instructions and other motivating factors. After the first
few minutes, there is no stimulation which has not been
experienced recently; both the negative stimuli and the
signals become familiar, and so do the kinesthetic and other
stimuli associated with the subjects responses. As time goes
on, the impact of these several types of stimuli declines
gradually, contributing to a decline in the subjects level
of activation. As activation sinks below the optimal range
for the task, performance will suffer. . .Any factors which
sustain the total impact of stimulation will sustain activa-
tion, and performance will be maintained. . .In principle, it
64

should be possible for subjects to maintain activation through
the impact of mental sets or of muscular activity extraneous
to but not interfering with the activity required for the
task."
"A significantly greater percentage of signals were
detected under conditions of variety auditory stimulation
than under white noise conditions. The improvement under
variety conditions was greatest during the last quarter
hour of the watchstanding period."
"Performance on a vigilance display presenting easily
detectable signals was shown to be enhanced by requiring
the observer to monitor simultaneously another display,
presenting difficult signals via a different sensory modality.'
The effort here should be to provide "peripheral tasks"
which will serve to improve the operator's primary task
performance. Operation of a sonar tape or bearing time
recorder, measuring noise and source levels, maintaining
the contact log, obtaining bathythermograph information,
briefing the 00D on acoustic conditions, and providing turn-
count and target description information, could provide the
desired stimulation. The 00D must be aware of the true
conditions in sonar, and the attitude and sensitivities of
the sonar watchstander(s) involved. If perceived by the
watchstander as a form of harassment, such efforts are harm-
ful; but with tact on the part of the 00D, and an appreciation
by the sonar operator of the real nature of the problem, such
efforts are worthwhile.
3. Instructions which emphasize the importance of the
task to be undertaken, and the constant or intermittent
presence of a supervisory figure, both help to raise perfor-
mance above control levels (2,3,18,19,21; Davies and Tune,
1969). The relieving 00D should spend no less than 10 min-
utes in Sonar Control prior to relieving the watch. He
should see and listen to the prevailing acoustic conditions,
and inform the relieving sonar operator(s) v/ho should also be
present exactly what the nature of operations will be during
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the next watch. The nature of the bottom, water depth, and
actual likelihood of encountering a submarine should be dis-
cussed. He should establish realistic goals for the sonar
operators — the goal is not to detect a submarine, that
almost never happens; but rather to detect any ship that
comes within 8,000 yards, or some other realistic figure.
If the operator acquires an active contact, by knowing both
the transmitter source level and the returning signal sound
level he can determine propagation loss. With this informa-
tion and if he then acquires passive contact he can compute
target signal strength and see how it compares with tabulated
values. He can make up his own table of observed values,
and then attempt making passive detection range predictions
for various types of ships. There are endless variations;
•observed bathythermograph traces can be compared to oceano-
graphic atlases, and to message forecasts. Ray path plotting
can be performed. Recordings of interesting signals can be
obtained, with the ship maneuvering to assist. The results
of this type of interest and coordination are sure to be
better than that obtained when the operator's only task is
to "detect a submarine." Similar interest should be taken
in the Electronic Warfare area. The 00D, JOOD, and CIC
Watch Officer should frequently and randomly visit these
operators when circumstances allow. The benefits are two-
fold: operator performance is enhanced, and supervisor
knowledge of the task is improved.
4. The final recommendation is addressed to the operator
himself. In passive search, there is no question of the
great advantage gained by wearing comfortable high fidelity
headphones. If not available on board, several should be
obtained commercially. Good quality stereophonic headphones
can be easily modified for this application. Submarine sonar
operators, who make a career of passive search, would not
consider standing a watch without this aid. In active search,
a common practice for destroyermen is to remove the head-
phones in favor of the wall speaker. This is unfortunate,
because without the close audio coupling that the headphones
afford, faint echoes which would otherwise be detected can
not be heard. Operationally this is easy to verify— simply
compare the signals heard over the speaker and then through
the headphones for some weak surface contact; it should be
possible to determine (from radar) the range that echoes are
no longer heard through each of these devices. The difference
in range will be a measure of the performance improvement
gained by using the headphones.
It is desirable to leave the wall speaker on, since
other personnel present in the space might detect a signal
missed by the assigned operator (6). The vigilance decrement
with time for individuals exposed to noise and echoes from
the speaker is not great (9), and would be even further
decreased or vanish when the individuals shifted tasks. The
audio threshold shift and ability to discriminate doppler due
to this continual exposure is also negligible (20). If a
very experienced "visitor" happens to be in the space and can
overhear the speaker, very significant performance gains
might be achieved (24).
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As regards searching, the systematic beam-to-beam
search which has been the practice for years (Sonar Tech-
nician, 1969) gives systematic area coverage as the ship
maneuvers. With the ship stopped or on a constant course,
it might be preferable to search from baffle to baffle. As
with any search, intelligence which can help narrow the
limits of the search should be sought out and used, and
search sectors adjusted accordingly. Other operating
parameters such as range scale, mode, and pulse length
should be varied doctrinally and in a way compatible with
the ship's objective and tactical realities. The only way
to achieve this is to have open and almost continuous dialogue
with all members of the "search team" — the 00D, CIC
personnel, and other sonar personnel.
H. ADDITIONAL REFERENCES
The effect of the environment upon ASW, if not well
understood, is certainly well appreciated by anyone with
experience in this field. Marsh (1950) presents a theory of
the anomalous propagation of acoustic waves in the ocean.
Somervell (1958) discusses the principal environmental
problems related to ASW. Urick (1967) is a basic textbook
dealing with the principles of underwater sound. Watson and
McGirr (1972) provide a list of further references which




A. NIGHT VISION (Generally from Jayle, 1959)
1. Requirements
The carrier landing accident rate in the U.S. Navy
is four times greater by night than it is by day (Brictson,
1969). The death rate from automobile accidents occuring
at night in rural areas exceeds the day rate by about 2h
times, in the cities the night death rate is about four
times that of the day rate (Jayle: Accident Prevention
Department of the Casualty and Surety Company, USA) . The
lookout at night must do all that is expected of the daytime
lookout, plus he must be able to see at night. This funda-
mental requirement for good vision at night seems so clear
that it is frequently assumed to exist, when in fact the
lookout's adaptation is so incomplete that he might more
accurately be assumed blind. Admiral Cope in his definitive
57*4 page guide, Command at Sea (Cope and Bucknell, 1966),
considers the subject only briefly: "During inclement
weather, the Officer of the Deck must give attention to ...
night vision adaptation ... of his lookouts," and in an
Appendix he suggests how the 00D should treat his own eyes,
"Do not relieve the watch until your eyes are properly
adapted to the darkness. While on watch, subject your eyes
to light as little as possible."
Historically, the period shortly following watch
relief is the time when collisions at sea most often occur.
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If suddenly at night the visual acuity of all bridge watch-
standers were reduced significantly, how much greater the
risk of collision would seem to be. The simultaneous relief
of key bridge watchstanders by improperly night adapted
individuals represents such a situation. Under traditional
bridge manning, with three lookouts, and an 00D and JOOD,
such simultaneous relief occurs if five individuals are
relieved as a group. Under the current Shipboard Automation
and Manpower Reduction Project (Chief of Naval Operations,
August 1972b), one lookout and a single 00D are specified;
and simultaneous relief occurs when only these two are
relieved together. If neither relief is properly prepared
to see at night, then the situation is perilous indeed. The
significantly greater speeds and reduced manning of next
generation surface craft such as the hydrofoil, the air
cushion/surface effect vehicle, and the semisubmerged cata-
maran (cf. Truax, 1973; Clifford, 1973; Naval Institute,
1973), further intensifies the problem.
2. Variables and Components of Night Vision
Nichols and Powers (1964) list six major categories
of variables and conditions affecting visual perception in
outdoor settings. Although not exhaustive, no fewer than
28 factors are cited (Brown, 1973 contains a review of later
literature). Of these factors we have some control over
the following:
1. Observer variables — visual adaptation level, acuity
at adaptation level, attention, motivation, training.
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2. Situational variables — instructions, time permitted
for judgements, degree of search required, criteria for
correctness of response.
We will consider here only the physiological variables
affecting night vision. These variables apply not just to
the designated lookouts, but to anyone who must use his
eyes in near darkness. The Commanding Officer, arising from
his sea cabin to check a contact; the navigator, balancing
the need for darkness to see a faint star, against brightness
to see the horizon; and the casual crewman strolling along
the darkened deck who trips and is lost overboard — any
of these individuals could perform better if they were
properly night adapted first.
Night visual perception has been investigated vari-
ously as responses to different luminous sensations which
include:
1. Light sense — ability to perceive faint light,
graphically represented by the typical dark adaptation
curve, Figure 4.
2. Differential light sense — ability to distinguish
one definite luminous area from another by comparison.
3. Morphoscopic sense — ability to recognize the form
of an object.
4 . Sense of depth .
5 . Sense of movement .
Experience shows that responses in the above five instances
are similar, and yield basically the same adaptation curves.
For the 00D conning a ship at night, it is important to
remember that there is a diminution of stereoscopic visual
acuity, or depth perception, in night vision which runs
70

and is the reason that under low illumination we see objects
in shades of black and white. Rod sensitivity is rapidly
lost at high levels of illumination and only slowly gained
under low levels of illumination. About 25 minutes is
required to fully adapt to darkness following exposure to
sunlight. In general, the decrease in visual threshold
during the first seven or eight minutes is due to an increase
in the sensitivity of the cones, and, to a small degree, to
the dilation of the pupil which increases the light-
gathering power of the eye. The additional increase in
threshold, which occurs after eight minutes, is due to the
function of the rods. That period of time is entirely
appropriate for the gradual darkening of the evening, but
it can put serious limits on vision in other circumstances.
As suggested by the discontinuity In the adaptation
curve, a dramatic change in the nature of seeing occurs with
large changes in illumination. Nichols and Powers (1964)
assembled tables and curves which allow a Commander to
predict for various times of twilight and conditions of
moonlight the luminosity of the night sky. A lookout whose
light sense was less than this would perceive simply a black
sky. If the ocean had no luminosity other than light
reflected from the sky, he would also perceive a black ocean
and no horizon. With time, more complete adaptation would
be achieved, and the night sky might be observed. Stars and
lights however might be seen at any time.
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k. Unique Role of Red
Red light is the lowest frequency in the visual
spectrum, and the rods are relatively insensitive to energy
at this frequency (Wald, 1969). As red light intensity is
increased we are able to perceive the light first through
action of the cones, and we recognize it as the color red.
Much more intense red illumination would begin to stimulate
the rods, but this occurs above the level where red lighting
is already adequate for good cone vision. This phenomenon
explains why red goggles or red lighting measures produce
night adaptation. Since red light does not stimulate the
rods, the rods begin to adapt as if they were in total
darkness. After about 25 minutes of such measures, essen-
tially full adaptation is achieved. Similar adaptation
begins whenever rod stimulation ceases whether the action
is due to simply closing the eyes, sleeping, or entering a
dark room.
5 . Glare and Dazzling
Some degree of adaptation will be lost whenever
glare or higher frequency (above dark red) light is present
and allowed to enter the eye and strike the rods (dazzling).
Protection against dazzling can often be accomplished by
eliminating the sources. Automobile style electric cigarette
lighters can be installed which have the effect of removing
flashes of light from matches and lighters; black-out
curtains, black paint, and tape do much to remove sources of
dazzling glare. Pilot house windows should be kept
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scrupulously clean not only to eliminate a,s much as possible
dazzling reflections, but to maintain maximum transparency.
A slight film of oil, dirt, or salt spray may cause loss of
50 per cent of the light passing through a window (National
Search and Rescue Manual, 1959). Lighted status boards,
compasses, and gyro repeaters should emit no light other
than red. This is often accomplished by installing filters
or painting the bulbs red. Red nail polis/h is very effective
on smaller "peanut" bulbs. The typical bridge radar repeater
is poorly human engineered from the standpoint of the night
adapted eye. To obtain information from this scope, the 00D
is required to look directly into and focuvs on a source of
(often) non-red light. This display provides information
invaluable to the shiphandler; it is not appropriate to deny
him this data, yet the cost of a look is tihe loss of night
vision.
A solution to this problem is to naake a few large
red filters, and keep them near the repeater. The 00D can
place one, two, or as many as is required over the scope to
appropriately filter the display and yet allow adequate tar-
get recognition. A more sophisticated variable density
filter is proposed by Tousey (19^5):
This filter, "permits a continuous change in CRT colour
from yellow to red, as well as dimming to blackout without
change in colour. It consists essentially of two polaroid
disks having a wave retardation disk sandwiched between
them. By rotating only the outer polaroid disk brightness
could be varied without colour change... By rotating only
the retardation disk, the two polaroid disks remain parallel,
the scope becomes redder and dimmer. In an operation where
night vision was needed the operator, for example, a pilot,
would set the display to be red during search and approach,




Protection against dazzling from projectile, tracer
bullet, or missile, flashes could be accomplished by staring
in another direction, or closing one or both eyes. Due to a
reduced field of view under night vision, staring away from
a flash by 60 degrees or more places the flash outside of
the peripheral field and affords some protection from
dazzling. The rods of each eye respond independently to
dazzling, so if one eye is shadowed by the nose, or protected
by blinking, eye patch, or hand, adaptation of the protected
eye will be maintained. Experiments have consistently shown
that better night vision is achieved with both eyes func-
tioning together than with one closed or obscured, so
although adapting only one eye for night duties while using
the other for daytime vigil is possible, it will not give
us our best results.
Prolonged dazzling can also cause serious long-term
night vision difficulties. Four and one-half hours exposure
to sunshine such as would be experienced by sunbathers or
deck workers (the usual lookout) has been shown to produce
a 50 per cent night vision deficiency later the same day
following 30 minutes of dark adaptation (Jayle: Johnson and
Dreher, 19^6). Other experimenters observed that the noxious
effect of prolonged dazzling may remain several weeks (Jayle:
Peckham, 19^7). By wearing ordinary dark or polarized
glasses the deficiency can be reduced considerably (Jayle:
Hect, and others, 19^8). Dazzling from the sunlight during
a previous daytime watch would lower the efficiency of that
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individual at his nighttime watch. The daytime wearing of
dark glasses (the darker the better) to prevent long term
dazzling by all those who have nighttime visual responsibil-
ities will improve nighttime visual performance (Jayle:
Peckham, 1952; Bule, 1956). In an extreme case, night vision
improvement was reported under wartime conditions where night
lookouts were kept in darkness at all times, and used only
for night lookout duties (Jayle: Angius, 19^6).
6. Ambient Illumination
Visual acuity in a red luminance field is poorer
than for any other color lighting, and visual fatigue is the
greatest. In realization of this fact, recent ship altera-
tions have been approved instituting blue lighting measures
in shipboard Combat Information Centers (CIC's). This is
accomplished by simply fitting blue tubes of cellulose
acetate over "daylight" fluorescent tubes. Blue lighting
gives the greatest visual acuity of any color illumination
for a given intensity, exceeding even white light in this
regard. In CIC's which have adopted blue lighting, visibility
has been improved and dials or instructions can be clearly
seen where formerly spot lighting or flashlights were
employed. In some cities, emergency vehicles have been
equipped with more visible blue warning lights. Low levels
of blue ambient illumination also give a slight advantage




Unfortunately, blue light Is perceived by the rods
of the eye, and complete night adaptation will not be possible
in such an environment unless red goggles are worn. A
frequent complaint of personnel in blue CIC's is: "We can
not see blue chart lines," or "The light is too bright."
The U.S. Hydrographic Office has for years been working to
remove red, orange, and buff from charts because of their
tendencies to disappear under red lighting. This has led
to the substitution of magenta or purple for red and orange,
and gray for buff (Bowditch, 1966); and these later colors
are difficult to see under blue. A chart should always be
tested for this difficulty prior to actual use, and re-
colored as necessary. The complaint about brightness is due
solely to dazzling, and the fact that when the individual
emerges from CIC he has lost his night adaptation and can
not see well in the dark. If he had duties which did not
require good night adaptation, and he remained only in CIC,
then the "too bright" complaint would vanish. In blue CIC's,
even without goggles, the lower intensity of the blue
lighting typically employed allows some preadaptation to
occur. This adaptation is not more complete than would be
obtained while observing white light of the same intensity
however. Because the Commanding Officer and other super-
visory personnel are so often required to move between CIC
and the bridge during periods of darkness, and the continual
donning and removing of proper goggles to protect night
vision seems so onerous, serious consideration should be
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given to keeping CIC red. Extra fixtures or red filtered
spotlights can be installed where particular individuals
require additional lighting.
7. Red Glasses and Goggles
Several styles of red glasses and goggles are
presently available both in the Navy supply system and
commercially. From the standpoint of night adaptation the
best goggles would prevent any light except dark red from
entering the eye. Non-dense red lenses which emit princi-
pally red, but all other colors as well; dark glasses other
than red, or small lenses that allow light leakage around
the sides, are not particularly effective but will allow
partial adaptation to occur. The partially adapted eye
requires less time to become fully adapted under darkened
conditions, but if all else is equal the light sense threshold
will be the same as if partial adaptation had not occurred.
The aviator style goggles which seal around the forehead,
cheekbones, and bridge of the nose are probably the most
effective protection and can be worn comfortably for short
periods. Condensation on the inside of the lens and the
heavy feeling of this mask become annoying when worn
continually. Because of the goggle's high efficiency, OOD's
and lookouts should wear them for at least 25 minutes prior
to relieving the watch at night. This procedure is easily
adopted by having the messenger hand goggles to the appropri-
ate individuals as he wakes them.
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For continuous use, wrap-around red plastic eyeglasses
are available. These are comfortable and allow functional
vision under normal illumination. The CO, XO, Navigator,
and others who might be assigned responsibilities on the
bridge can wear these glasses routinely at meals, movies,
or other activities where overall red lighting measures are
not in effect. If the need then arises, rapid complete
adaptation will be possible.
This practice is common aboard submarines where it
is extremely critical to ensure that whenever a periscope
is exposed, the eye at the other end is performing in an
optimal way. In surface ships, lacking the incentive of
stealth, and possessing a multiplicity of visual and elec-
tronic sensors, it appears that good individual night vision
is of lesser importance. However it is less than optimal
from a systems standpoint to accept inferior performance
from a particular sensor because of redundancy. Further,
future ships simply will not have this degree of duplicity.
8. Summary
To secure the maximum night efficiency several
conditions are essential:
1. The most complete dark adaptation must be obtained
as speedily as possible.
2. This degree of adaptation must be maintained.
3. The maximum capability of the dark adapted eye must
be utilized.
l|
. Protection against the adverse effects of general
physical fatigue, lack of sleep, fasting, and various types
of intoxication (alcohol, tobacco) is essential.
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An adequate degree of dark adaptation is made possible by
two principal factors:
1. A preliminary darkening, lasting about 25 minutes,
corresponding to the time required for the normal adaptation
curve to become horizontal.
2. An absence or limitation of prolonged dazzling during
the period preceeding darkening.
These principles will help to ensure that our lookouts and
others charged with nighttime visual responsibilities have
the prerequisite visual thresholds. There remains the
problem of utilization. According to Jayle (1959):
"Visual thresholds and nocturnal vision are two terms which
have nothing or very little in common, but are generally
mistaken one for the other. In fact, a proper night vision
requires a sufficient night-visual threshold in much the same
way as walking requires non-paralyzed lower limbs. However,
the analogy does not extend any further, and it seems rather
surprising that the psycho-physiological exploration of
night vision has been until now commonly mistaken for the
investigation regarding elementary thresholds."
The next section deals with the question of utilization, and
will answer the questions of how to best conduct visual
search once proper adaptation has been achieved.
B. SEARCH TECHNIQUES
1 . Existing Practices
An unexpected benefit of our space program was the
attention focused on the human factor problems of visual
search. Fischl (I960) described the typical scenario:
"The objects of search were basketball-size capsules
and larger vehicles. Some of the dimensions of the search
task were that the vehicles were primarily afloat at sea,
would have to be searched through an illumination range
covering night with no moon through night with full moon
to the high level of bright sunlight. Additional limiting
factors in the search task were clouc coverages and dis-
criminability from wave whltecaps. The search angles
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through which the object had to be viewed were both large
(search from aircraft at approximately 10,000 feet) and
small (search from surface craft)."
In order to increase the probability of detection through
visual search, definitive research in the following areas
was called for:
1. "Research workers should be trying to pin down and
quantify the effects of various magnification aids. Are
they of any use in visual search? Are they purely for
identification, and not to be used for search? . .
.
2. "We should like to see further definitive work in
the psychophysiology of the visual mechanism in search
tasks. This should lead to alternative methods for visual
search, each with statements of the probability of detection.
3. "Also on the personnel, as opposed to hardware, side
of the ledger we believe that once search methods have been
treated a little more fully, programs of visual training
may yield great dividends in maximizing the probability
of detection.
4. "Finally, a comprehensive study of individual
differences may provide clues leading toward a program of
selection. It is not unlikely that some people may perform
consistently better than others in a visual search situation
and the development of protocols for identifying these
individuals would appear to be time well spent."
Even with requirements for such definitive research,
the solution of practical problems of search today still
seems to be more of an art than a science. Even so, many
"how to" guides espousing optimal search procedures are
available. The following rules for night search are given
in the British Civil Defense Instruction Manual (Jayle, 1959)
1. "Aim off with your eyes at night. Look a little to
one side of whatever you want to see. Find which direction
suits you best; above, to side, or below; but never look
directly at what you want to see.
2. "Do not stare fixedly — if you do, the image may




3. "Do not 'scan' fast; move your eyes to a series of
widely spaced positions, looking for a few seconds in each
direction and pay attention to the things you are not looking
at directly. If you think you see something, do not look
at it, but look a little to one side of it.
H. "Stop scanning for 10 seconds every few minutes.
If you scan continuously your eyes will partly black out.
5. "If you have to look at a lit area, protect the dark
adaptation of one eye by keeping it shut. Learn to snap
one eye shut instinctively whenever a bright light is turned
on."
In a more explicative sense, the Watch Officer's
Guide, a handbook intended for and used widely by U.S. Navy
Officers (Noel, I960) provides the following:
"Since, to see at night, you are using areas of the
retina which you use only slightly most of the time, you
must learn a special technique for distinguishing objects.
At night, objects which can be seen "out of the corner of
your eye" often disappear when looked at directly. There-
fore, the trick is to be sure not to stare or strain the
eyes in any single direction.
"A slow, roving gaze which systematically covers all
quadrants of the sky or field of vision by a simple geometri-
cal pattern picks up dimly contrasted objects. When you
pick up an object this way, you naturally think of fixing
your eyes upon it for a good look — and right there, you
may find it disappears. You can make it reappear by using
"off center" vision."
For the most part, these doctrines have grown out of
conclusions drawn from laboratory work, and are to some
degree unrealistic. There is a real danger in general or
basic research of so simplifying the problem to permit it
to be handled more easily that it is not a problem any more.
There has been very little applied research In vision.
The British procedure calling for a scanning technique
of repeated fixations at widely spaced positions for a few
seconds duration is in sharp contrast to Noel's technique of
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a slow, roving gaze in a simple geometrical pattern.
Laboratory experiments support either procedure, depending
on the instructions given to the observers, nature of the
target, constrast, and numerous other variables. The
recurrent instruction to avoid staring directly at a dim
target under night vision is based on the clinical fact that
a central blind spot exists under night vision which for
some individuals is as little as 1/2 degree, and others as
much as five degrees (Jayle: Tibi, 1951; and others). Night
visual acuity is -clearest at four to six degrees from the
center of vision. Night light sensitivity is greatest
fifteen to twenty degrees from the center of vision (as
references, the full moon's diameter is about 1/2 degree;
and the back of a man's fist, held at arm's length, subtends
about six degrees). This is in sharp contrast to our day-
time visual acuity which is sharpest directly at the center
of vision, and falls off rapidly at slight offsets. During
the day, at ten degrees, our relative visual acuity is only
twenty per cent of what we perceive in center vision (Thomas,
1969). Our daytime blind spot typically subtends five
degrees, and is located fifteen to twenty degrees from
center .vision. The daytime blind spot is rarely noticed
because of the overlapping fields of the two eyes; and
because the "hole" occurs in our peripheral field, away from




In spite of the problems inherent in applying the
results of basic research to the development of a satisfactory
general theory of search, we can develop some useful proce-
dural rules which might be helpful in many cases. First, we
must distinguish between day and night searches. The
ability to see at night is in many ways independent of an
individual's daytime visual acuity.
2. Problems at Night
Night blindness with no apparent decrement in day-
time visual acuity exists at various times in many individ-
uals from both psychological and pathological causes.
Psychological night blindness has been observed in various
neuroses, psychoses, and hysteria (Jayle, 1959). These
factors which might exclude an individual from a ship's
Reliability Program (Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, 1965)
could also much reduce the effectiveness of such an individ-
ual as a nighttime lookout. Principal pathological causes
are serious diseases which would disqualify a person from
sea duty until cured, dietary deficiencies (Vitamin A
deficiency most likely single cause), and diabetes and
glaucoma. These later two diseases are mentioned because
it is entirely possible that individuals assigned to ship-
board duty today have undetected or undiagnosed diabetes or
glaucoma, and even where detected diabetes does not neces-
sarily disqualify an individual from destroyer duty.
Congenital night blindness of varying degree is also
possible. Aging has a significant effect on all forms of
night visual functions, usually beginning at 40 years of
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age, and becoming more pronounced after 50 (Jayle, 1959).
Under these circumstances, a simple shipboard test of a
lookout's night vision would seem an appropriate preliminary
to any visual search doctrine. It is assumed that the
lookout's daytime vision is 20/20 or has been corrected to
that previously.
Night myopia (nearsightedness) occurs during night
adaptation, and is maintained while the eyes are dark
adapted. This is of practical significance to farsighted
individuals who may see better at night without their usual
corrective glasses. Myopes would need stronger corrections
at night than during the day. For the normal eye, a correc-
tive lens of approximately -1.5 diopters would give improved
night vision. Ronchi (19^7: from Jayle, 1959) found that
when night myopia was corrected, a 50 per cent improvement
in the night vision threshold occurred for a small test area.
For a person who wears glasses and is used to them, a second
pair with this -1.5d. correction is recommended for night
use. For the individual who does not normally wear glasses,
a nighttime lens of -1.5d. would improve his visual threshold;
but the discomfort, and fogging or dirtying of the lens which
he would not be accustomed to or otherwise have to tolerate,
would tend to reduce his overall performance as a lookout.
This phenomenon does explain why for clear binocular vision





In search without binoculars, Coates, Loeb, and
Aluisi (1972) determined that the observing strategy of
gazing straight ahead was superior to scanning when the task
involved detecting readily observed colored lights in the
peripheral field. This technique might be useful when
looking for a submarine flare from a known bearing at a
fairly close range such as the yellow "surfacing signal";
but the more usual task requires searching for barely distin-
guishable lights or contacts on or near the horizon. Where
the bearing is unknown, and the search area is wide (the air
and sea to starboard for example), a scanning technique is
required. The following major results were obtained from
studies conducted by Brody, Corbin, and Volkman (i960) and
Lovie (1966):
1. Systematic search generally reduced detection times
for low contrast targets.
2. Free search was more efficient for high visibility
targets.
3. The search time varies directly with the area over
which the subject must search.
A recommended procedure for searching the horizon for low
contrast targets or barely perceptible lights would involve
some form of systematic search. Further, if we could
reduce the lookout's search area, we could expect his
efficiency to be increased by a proportional amount.
I\
. Search Specificity
A study undertaken by Martin Marietta Corporation
(Fov/ler and Jones, 1972) found an almost linear relationship
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between a searcher's field of view and both the probability
of detection and time to detection. A relative increase in
the observer's effective field of view is achieved by
decreasing the area over which he must search. Much current
shipboard doctrine has been developed, utilizing this
principle— sonar "search arcs," lookout "sectors of respon-
sibility," and ECM "threat bands," are all designed to
concentrate attention in a particular area.
While dogmatic adherence to "doctrine" might be a
useful training device, searchers should realize that there
is nothing inherently optimum in searching a greater area
than required. As an example, the "60 degree sonar search
arc" can be extremely detrimental to performance, particularly
with today's longer range sonars where the angular search
rate is so agonizingly slow. If conditions are such that a
lost sonar contact can be localized within a certain 30
degree sector, then sonar should search this more specific
area. Theoretically this refinement has just doubled the
probability of reacquiring contact.
Practically, a systematic search that uniformly
covers the entire field of visual responsibility is impos-
sible to achieve under shipboard conditions. This condition
is created in the lab by the use of visual scanners or
masking devices, and approximated in some aircraft installa-
tions by automatic scanning exposure devices. Numerous
experiments have been conducted establishing that coverage
in any unaided search is grossly non-uniform (White and Ford,
87

1960a). An interesting demonstration of this fact is
contained in the sequence of photographs obtained from the
eye-marker camera of Thomas (1969) where the eyes' fixation
points are superimposed on the scene before the viewer.
When an observer is looking for something, his eyes move in
a discontinuous fashion, so that information is gathered in
a succession of discrete fixations separated by very rapid
eye movements. The normal length of time per fixation is
on the order of a third to a quarter of a second. This gives
us two parameters which we might examine—the overall pattern
of eye movement, and the fixation rate.
As previously mentioned, we can modify the lookout's
search pattern with favorable results simply by giving him a
smaller search area, or instructing him to concentrate his
search in some important or high probability area. Since a
visual lookout can not search wide sectors of sea and air
assignment as quickly or as completely as he can search
smaller areas, consideration of the capabilities and limita-
tions of the visual lookout should be made in.the context of
the total sensory environment in which he is to be employed.
With effective air search radar it is inefficient to have
the lookout gazing skyward to detect aircraft. Low flyer
detection, surveillance of the ship's helicopter, or identi-
fication of a flight in response to a question from CIC, is
entirely appropriate but this in another employment.
Similarly, with operable sonar the initial detection of a
submarine by the lookout sighting a periscope is so unlikely
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that as a general rule the lookout's capabilities could be
more effectively utilized in some other role. The circum-
stances of each ship will differ, but the important concept
is that the more control exercised over where the lookout
searches, the more effective that search will be.
5. Eye Scan
Given a well defined search area, there are several
techniques of eye scan which an observer may attempt to use.
Several typical laboratory experiments compare horizontal
scan, vertical scan, and even diagonal scan results. Where
the observer must find targets in fields which have both
height and breadth, no technique seems superior to layered
horizontal search (Lovie, 1966). In the shipboard environ-
ment, where the field is horizontally stratified with the
highest probability area often along or just below the
horizon, it would seem that a horizontal search would almost
always be preferred. Scans could be made most frequently
along this high probability "band." On particular radials
or sectors where a greater intensity of search is desired,
such as directly ahead of the vessel for. small objects or
contacts; or directly astern to detect overboard equipment,
oil, or personnel; then vertical search might be appropriate.
This degree of instruction may be impractical or superfluous
in most shipboard situations. Based on Teichner's (i960)
analysis of several visual search experiments, most observers
are unable to perform a patterned search even if they want
to. Even under laboratory conditions and when so instructed
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by researchers, subjects did not consistently carry out a
sequential search process. Constraints of the medium, and
"human factors" are often cited as possible reasons for this
phenomena. This "human factor" is simply an acknowledgement
of the natural tendency of observers to make fixations on
objects, borders, or shapes which have entered their
perceptual field and stimulated a visual interest either
through movement, contrast, or color. If a person is
searching, this type of stimulation simply overrides a
premeditated scanning pattern.
Seeing is done during fixations, and 85-90 per cent
of the total search time is occupied by fixations (Boynton,
I960). Even Noel's recommended "slow, roving gaze," is made
up of a series of fairly rapid individual fixations. The
possibility of increasing search efficiency by decreasing
fixation time exists. In reading it is not uncommon to
achieve gains of several hundred per cent by reducing this
fixation time. The normal fixation rate in reading is
relatively slow because of the habit of vocalizing—of saying,
forming, or thinking a word to ourself as we look at It.
Vocalizing slows down our fixation rate, and relatively slow
fixations become part of our normal way of seeing things.
Another factor contributing to this type of search lethargy




"The 'Madison Avenue' type spends his working hours
devising methods of visual (and other) conspicuousness
—
he does everything to make the single glance probability
equal to unity. His design is to reveal, not to hide
—
to reduce search to an absolute minimum. Extensive exposure
to such simple visual displays may (and this goes beyond
what one would call an educated guess) result in eye move-
ment patterns poorly adapted to difficult search tasks."
"Speed reading" courses are available which train
the individual to increase his fixation rate without mechani-
cal devices (Evenlyn Wood Reading Dynamics is one). Scan rate
is determined by fixation rate, and eye movement between fixa-
tions. In one experiment involving low contrast target
recognition, the maximum detection efficiency was achieved
by observers fixating every 1/2 second. The optimal rate
varies considerably with the situation and the task of search
(Townsend and Fry, i960). With automatic scanning devices,
this time can be as low as 1/4 second. Operational data
analyzed by Lemar (i960) found observers using a relatively
slow 1 1/2 second fixation and seems to support the hypothesis
that operationally we scan too slowly to achieve maximum
efficiency. Oldfield (i960) determined that eye movement
should be sufficient to keep overlap between successive
fixations at a minimum, and fixation intervals should be
equally spaced.
The practical procedure recommended in National
Search and Rescue Manual (1959) addresses the fundamental
problem of optimum scan rate, and lets fixation rate and eye
movement rate occur as natural consequences. According to
the Manual, for search, eyes should move and pause for each
three or four degrees of lateral and/or vertical distance at
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a rate which will cover about ten degrees per second.
Objects will normally be sighted within fifty degrees of
the fixation point. At night, when searching for flares or
lights, do not pause so frequently.
Fixating and scanning do require visual reference
points, not only for structured search, but also for
completely free search. In the lab these references are
often artificially introduced. Automatic scanners or marks
on a screen through which the subject views the field are
common devices. Outside of the lab, such' references often
take the form of shapes or visual irregularities which we
do not view directly but are aware of only peripherally.
Such references seem to be a fundamental and necessary
component of prolonged search.
6. Uniform Field Difficulties
There is a physiological cost associated with pro-
longed search into a very blank or uniform field such as sky
or fog. Cohn (i960) summarized the results of his research
in this area:
"After prolonged exposure to a uniform field, many
subjects reported an experience of "blanking-out." For
instance, the subject may report simply having a feeling of
light with no external reference. In other instances, the
subject may report "not seeing anything." In the more
extreme phase of the phenomenon, which usually occurred only
after prolonged exposure of 10 to 20 minutes, there was a
"complete absence of seeing." In the last instance, the
subjects were not only completely unaware of vision as a
sense modality but seemed to lack feed-back from their eye
muscles. They often reported that they were uncertain as
to whether or not their eyes were open and were not capable
of voluntarily controlling their eye movement. Although,
blinking and eye movements usually were sufficient to bring
about a return of the visual field during most "blank-out"




After a 20 minute exposure to the field, a variety
of after-effects were observed. The subjects reported
extreme fatigue along with a feeling of great lightness of
body. Their motor coordination was poor and they were
unable to maintain balance. Their perception of time was
disturbed. They often complained of dizziness and behaved
in an extremely giddy, almost drunken manner. One subject
even reported suffering from temporary states of depersonali-
zation. These effects are similar to those observed under
much longer periods of sensory deprivation."
Analysis of many such experiments showed considerable indi-
vidual differences, with some lookouts far more susceptible
to the interfering effects of the uniform field than others.
Exposure times as short as 90 seconds interfered with the
recognition ability of some individuals.
These more immediate effects are due to a visual
phenomenon that Sells and Berry (1961) have termed "empty
field myopia." Whiteside (1957) describes this condition:
Irrespective of the brightness or darkness of the
environment
,
"in the presence of an empty visual field, subjects cannot
relax accommodation completely. Rather, accommodation is in
a constant state of fluctuation. . .An observer with normal
eyesight, then, is unable to focus at infinity if there is
no detail at infinity that is capable of being sharply
focused. Under these conditions the farthest he can focus
is a point about 1 to 2 miles away, and he becomes effectively
myopic by this amount."
Whiteside further determined that it can take as much as
60 seconds for the accommodation mechanism to completely
relax and return to infinite focus once some specific object
is sighted. National Search and Rescue Manual (1959)
suggests periodically focusing the eyes on some specific
object in the "no contrast" field such as whitecaps or
debris. If this is done frequently, "only a second will be
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required to break inward focus, and when the eyes are returned
to scanning they will focus properly." The necessary condi-
tions for empty field myopia rarely occur aboard ship, but
in such cases the lookout would be unaware that he is
focused short of the surface being searched and may miss
targets.
Generally, relatively brief exposures to a uniform
field are less detrimental from all standpoints than prolonged
exposures, and attempts should be made to minimize the dura-
tion whenever possible. If continuous search is required,
Cohn (i960) recommends some device which would permit
periodic differentiation of the field. In the shipboard
lookouts case, there would seem to be sufficient near-field
distractions (lifelines, masts, superstructure, parts of the
body including clothing and equipment, adjacent personnel) to
give adequate differentiation. Another possibility would be
to train the observer to blink frequently and look away from
the field whenever possible. This later recommendation is
the basis of the British Civil Defense Instruction to "stop
scanning for 10 seconds every few minutes. If you scan
continuously your eyes will partly black out." This habit of
relaxed blinking should actually be practiced at all times as
a technique which may prevent the onset of visual fatigue
(McParland, Holway, and Hurvich, 1942).
In a practical sense, it is unlikely that uniform
field vertigo will occur in the shipboard environment. The
great differences between individuals in susceptibility to
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a partial degradation after as little as 90 seconds though
makes it important to be aware of the effect; and instructions
to lookouts, particularly in fog or during air operations,
should include suitable precautions.
7 . Binoculars
Binoculars have a rather limited but special place in
visual search. Koopman (19^6) considered the question of
binocular assisted search and concluded that for most condi-
tions of search, particularly whenever visibility is less than
about ten miles, binoculars are not as effective as the naked
eye. Operations Development Force (1951) analyzed data
collected in searching with standard Navy 7x50 binoculars,
and found that against low contrast targets the use of
binoculars resulted in a reduction of search rate, even
though greater ranges of detection were sometimes observed.
Search rate reduction would occur to even greater degree with
the variable power (13X, 21X, 25X, or 32X eyepieces available)
ship's telescope, or 20 power mounted ship's binoculars.
Smith (I960) modeled the binocular search problem with param-
eters which included target range, size, and visibility and
achieved good agreement with the existing data. In the terms
of Smith's model, the use of binoculars is seen to offer no
advantage under any condition of visibility in considering
search area per glimpse. In terms of scanned length (range
from observer) , binoculars are advantageous only when the
meteorological visibility exceeds 20 miles. Only in terms
of maximum range of sighting does the use of binoculars
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appear to offer any advantage. Analyzing the results
achieved with binoculars in one particular search, Smith
concluded:
"...under all but the highest visibilities, the use
of binoculars is disadvantageous .. .When it is recalled that
no account has been taken in this study of such factors as
the increased effects of vibration and observer fatigue
associated with binocular usage, this conclusion is further
strengthened. However, because of the increased maximum
detection range possible, binoculars can still be a valuable
aid in identifying suspicious targets detected by the unaided
eye or other means. Furthermore, when a large amount of
search effort is available, tending to saturate the nearer
ranges of possible target positions, it may be profitable to
assign one or two observers to binocular search at ranges in
excess of the unaided-eye capability. In practical operations,
however, the likelihood of such a wealth of search effort is
remote.
"
The man overboard procedure where the ship has completed a
Williamson Turn (a standard procedure for reversing course)
and is returning along her previous track, with the crew
manning the rail in search, is one instance where a wealth of
search effort is available and binoculars might be utilized
to increase overall search effectiveness.
Where binocular search is appropriate, several recent
studies by Sternberg and Banks (1970) and Banks and others
(1971) show us how to achieve the greatest effectiveness.
The studies themselves are of interest because they demonstrate
rather clearly hov; analysis can lead a researcher in a some-
times unexpected direction, and that recognition of certain
human factor principles can be the first step in realizing
a significant improvement in system performance . In micro-
cosm, that is what this paper is about.
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The initial task in these studies had been to deter-
mine the effectiveness of a certain Army night vision device,
and also how effectiveness could be improved. Early in the
research, it was observed that operators were not performing
effectively. The failure to detect more targets could not
be explained by operator inability to see and discriminate
targets in the field, nor to fatigue and lowered vigilance
during prolonged use. It was also found that the problem
could not be eliminated simply by more practice in using the
devices. The major cause seemed to be that "the operators
did not search the field thoroughly nor at an adequate rate."
Although operators reported that they were systematically
searching the entire area, large sections of the area were
not searched for long periods because of backtracking and
irregular search patterns. As a consequence, a large propor-
tion of the targets missed were never even in the searcher's
field of view.
To improve search effectiveness, techniques which
would produce a systematic and comprehensive coverage of the
search area on a regular basis were developed. Several
alternative procedures were examined:
1. Continuous movement (at a variable rate) of the
device, stopping only to examine some object of interest.
2. Discontinuous movement with the device moved in
discrete steps and the image display examined for some
(variable) period of time before the device was again moved.
Two variations of this second technique were introduced
differing in the size of the step. Operationally, this
variation in step size produced either an overlap or a
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non-overlap of the adjacent segments of the terrain which
were viewed through the device on successive steps.
Under analysis, either systematic method gave
basically the same results. When compared to the. results of
search using the original more natural procedures, detection
gains of 35 to 80 per cent were achieved. With a systematic
search, operator performance on a 75 degree area was just
about equal to that of an operator using original procedures
on a 35 degree area. In this experiment a single operator
using systematic search could cover a wide area as effectively
as two men using natural search each covering half the area.
Personnel should receive the following instructions per-
taining to binocular search:
1. Use a regular search pattern which will produce a
systematic and comprehensive coverage of the search area on
a regular basis.
2. Use a variable scanning rate, with the rate of scan
adjusted to the difficulty of the area being examined.
3. At night, binoculars should be held straight forward
and the eyes turned off-center toward the perimeter of the
field. This will always seem unnatural at first, but it is
the only way to use night vision effectively.
Additionally, training should include care and cleaning of
the binoculars, night and day focusing for each eye, and
interpupillary distance adjustments (Signalman, 1968).
8 . Search Summation
It should be clear by now that optimal visual search
techniques cannot be specified as such in any general
statement. Efficient, systematic eye scan alone is not the
key. Boynton (I960) analyzed the eye movements of both
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experienced photointerpreters and novices in the same search
situation, and found they did not exhibit significant
differences in eye movements. Fixations can occur directly
on target, and that target might not actually be seen.
This suggests that the most important kind of information
that is needed for an observer to achieve optimal search is
not a book of rules about "How to Search," but rather a solid
background of information about target characteristics and
the specific environment which is to be searched. This
philosophy is consistent with our knowledge of other complex
sensors. To properly employ Electronic Warfare equipment we
must be thoroughly briefed on the nature of the target. To
operate sonar most effectively we need to have up-to-date
environmental information. The human sensor is no less
sophisticated or complex. In addition, pre-task instructions
are an important source of motivation in vigilance tasks, and
this factor alone can have a significant positive effect
(Lucaccini, Preedy, and Lyman, 1968).
There are, however, a few fundamental "ground rules"
which seem to apply in many cases (Adapted from Morris, I960):
1. Obtain a thorough briefing on what is to be searched
for, where to search, for how long, and the importance
attached to finding the object (or the penalty for not finding
it) .
2. Scan as fast as possible; use brief, rapid fixations
which cover the greatest area in the shortest time.
3. Do not use binoculars for detection of targets
expected to be at great or unknown range, or if time is
limited. The advantage of magnification does not compensate
for field size reduction.
k . Use binoculars for identification of targets once




1. Rain, Wind, and Cold
This Section is included to perpetuate the now wide-
spread practice of keeping lookouts protected from cold and
rain. It would be an unfortunate and incorrect interpreta-
tion of material presented elsewhere in this paper to
conclude that the lookout will be more "vigilant" if he is
kept cold; or that he will see better if he is outside in a
heavy rain rather than in the pilot house peering through
a slightly obscured window. An ingenious series of experi-
ments was carried out aboard the H.M.S. Kent and reported by
Poulton (1965) • Actual shipboard watchstanders were observed
under various conditions of rain, cold, and wind. It was
concluded that in watchkeeping on the open sea:
1. "Performance is likely to be impaired in rain.
2. "Performance is likely to become impaired towards
the end of the half-hour watch in the cold unless the lookout
is wearing adequate cold-weather clothing."
Poulton recommended that where it is necessary for lookouts
to maintain constant vigilance at sea:
1. "They should be protected from rain.
2. "In cold atmospheres they should be so clothed that
their body temperature does not fall during the watch."
The degree of coldness depends upon the combination of tem-
perature, wind velocity, and relative humidity, but any
significant decrease in the body core temperature would be
signaled by uncontrollable shivering. Under some conditions
cold weather can cause Injury and disability. Lookouts may




Frostbite is superficial freezing of the skin
following exposure to extreme cold generally at or below
equivalent temperatures of 20°F. (See Table 2.) It is
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Table 2. Chill Factor Data. Equivalent temperatures for
various air temperatures and constant (not gust)
dry wind velocities (Bureau of Naval Personnel,
1973).
by a sudden blanching of the skin which may be subjectively
noted as a momentary tingling sensation. The best treatment,
according to Neil and Tyler (1973) is:
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"prevention by wearing proper clothing and avoiding
continued exposure. When the need exists for prolonged
exposure, the "buddy system" of two men watching each other
for the telltale, yellow-white spots will minimize tissue
damage by early detection. In severe cold, if your face,
hands or bare skin stop hurting, investigate. You probably
have frostbite. When felt, frostbitten skin may be cold,
frosty and stiff.
"The best treatment for freezing injuries is quick
thawing in a water bath of 104° - 108°P. Superficial frost-
bite is rarely seen where such treatment is readily available
In the field or aboard ships, it should be immediately
treated whenever encountered by placing a warm hand over the
spot until it hurts again. Frostbite of the fingers can be
treated by placing them inside your clothes and next to the
skin. Under the armpits is an excellent place to warm the
hands . " -
Frostbite, if promptly treated is not serious and will not
result in any permanent damage to the tissue. If, on the
other hand, frostbite is not treated and measures are not
taken to prevent further prolonged exposure to the cold,
dry gangrene with loss of frozen tissue can result.
At sea, warmer water often keeps air temperatures
above the point where frostbite might usually be expected to
occur. However, as shown in Table 2, when the air is dry,
wind velocity is a significant factor in determining where
the danger of frostbite first exists (Chill Condition II).
With a fairly typical relative wind of 15 knots, frostbite
can occur with dry air temperatures as warm as 40°F. Even
with air temperatures as warm as 50°F, routine destroyer
operations can produce relative winds in excess of the 35
knots required to produce frostbite.
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VI. OFFICER OF THE DECK
A. AUTHORITY
The authority exercised by the Officer- of the Deck in
the execution of his duties is a function of policy estab-
lished by the Commanding Officer. Often ttoe OOD's performance
is based more on his perception of this policy than it is on
the broader shipwide objectives which the . Commanding Officer
actually seeks to satisfy. What the Commanding Officer must
ensure is that in major policy decision areas, responsibility
and authority are delegated in the way which will most directly
contribute to overall readiness. This matter requires con-
tinual attention and adjustment, since optimal relationships
are never static. In a study of organizational effectiveness,
Valenzi, and others (1972) concluded: "Perhaps the most
important point to note... is that 'successful' organizations
changed in some way when the environment changed, while
'unsuccessful' organizations did not."
Shipboard duties are structured around battle readiness
requirements, and the shipboard organization must be capable
of acting in compliance with existing Rules of Engagement.
These Rules in turn are subject to constant modification and
refinement. Since no set of rules will cover all conceivable
circumstances, the basic operating philosophy of the Command-
ing Officer must be clearly understood by each watchstander
and related to his own duties in a completely non-ambiguous
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manner. Goldhamer (1950) discussed the relationship between
policy and performance:
"Another example of a major policy decision , the
effects of which are probably quite diffuse and cannot be
allocated to a particular point in an operation or campaign,
bears on the lines of authority that policy establishes.
Thus, for example, in American bombers command authority is
vested in the pilot; this is not the case in Soviet planes.
Is there an advantage in the latter procedure? From the
systems analysis standpoint such questions become crucial
only if such policy alternatives could 'sufficiently' alter
performance level (either in a single strike or campaign)
.
There are, of course, an endless number of things that could
conceivably make a difference. What is required is a judge-
ment, sensitized by contact with operating personnel and by
general professional knowledge, on what possibilities one
should not ignore."
Equivalent questions aboard ship focus on weapons release
authority in a quick-reaction situation, optimal station for
the Commanding Officer in various actions, and authority and
responsibility of the CIC Evaluator relative to. the 00D. In
these cases at least, "sensitized judgements" are pre-
requisites to acceptable performance.
B. STRESS
"Stress" may be defined as a specification of the demands
that requirements of a particular task place on the individ-
ual (Fitts and Posner, 1967).
"When stress is defined by the demands a task makes, it
is immediately apparent that people do their best under
intermediate conditions of stress. Remove all input—all
environmental variation, all demands—and the individual at
best becomes bored, loses alertness, and perhaps goes to
sleep. At worst, he exhibits some of the hallucinations and
cognitive deficit sometimes reported in experiments specif-
ically designed to study sensory deprivation. People also
do poorly at the other extreme of stress. Increase the task
load to the point where it is impossible for the individual
to keep up with the demands placed upon him... and performance
again deteriorates. Man's best performance and the conditions
of work that he reports as most challenging, stimulating, and




Figure 5 is a classical representation of how man's perform-
ance might vary with stress in a particular situation.
Effectiveness of Performance
Increasing Stress over Time
Figure 5. Typical Performance/Stress Relationship
(Hare, 1962)
Task demands contributing to stress do not have to be
real. The anticipation of unpleasant events can have a
marked effect on an individual's behavior, in fact antici-
patory stress may sometimes be more disruptive to behavior
than the event itself (Waldeisen, Curran, and Wherry, 1967).
According to Hudson (1952), "the real issue in threat
research is the manner in which the individual perceives his
environment ."
Two questions immediately arise from the relationship
between performance and stress: first, how does an individual
adapt to input overload, or task stress; second, how may the
condition of stress that he prefers or finds most conducive
to successful effort be imposed? According to Miller (1964a),
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man has four basic mechanisms for adapting to input
overload:
1. Work faster and faster and let errors increase; in
other words, make less carefully considered decisions and
respond without considering all the information.
2. Disregard or filter out part of the information.
Wherever there is some basis for establishing priorities,
filtering out the less important information permits the
individual to do a relatively effective job. He handles
important messages or decisions and simply puts the remainder
aside
.
3. Queing. Input messages and other work are simply
allowed to wait in line. In most complex tasks, this waiting
line is short-term memory. Man's ability to cope effectively
with patterned input, and to organize his own patterned
output, is in large measure dependent on his ability to
accumulate a small amount of information before beginning
to respond to it.
k
. Collapse. The individual may simply stop work for
a time. This may seem highly nonadaptive, however in some
situations it is desirable. This is the traditional "All
Stop" order to the engines when the 00D becomes confused
about what the engines are doing and which way the ship
wants to go.
Most experimental evidence suggests that the optimal
level of irrelevant stimulation increases as the level of
task difficulty (relevant information) decreases (Yerkes-
Dodson Law: Broadbent, 1965) • This means that for an easy
task the optimal level of irrelevant stimulation will be
much higher than it is for a difficult task. Thus, repeti-
tive tasks can often be best performed while listening to
the radio or to an outside conversation; while serious work
involving much concentration is hampered by outside stimula-
tion. Fitts and Posner (1967) state:
"These data all suggest that relevant and irrelevant
stress are compensatory to some degree. That is, what is
important is the total level of stimulation, both relevant
and irrelevant. We have optimal performance when the total
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stimulation is at some intermediate level. . .Moreover, the
effects of stress are not static, but change as the task
goes on."
The Commanding Officer has some control over the quantity
and rate of stress-inducing stimulation in the OOD's environ-
ment. With experience the 00D builds up an ability at doing
two tasks at the same time (Kalsbeek, 1964); but this ability
is limited, and when overload occurs he will adapt to the
conditions with increasing inefficiency. The level of stress
can be reduced by reducing the OOD's responsibilities, per-
haps by temporarily assigning additional personnel to the
watch. There also exists the possibility of obtaining
optimum performance by varying the level of stress perceived
by the 00D, even though the level of environmental stimula-
tion remains constant. A nod of approval or expression of
trust can greatly relieve the anxiety or stress felt by a
harassed 00D, and the result should be reflected in his
performance. Conversely, performance on a low-stress mid-
watch might be greatly enhanced if the environment could be
made somewhat more stressful. The practice of holding
unscheduled man overboard or other shiphandling exercises,
intra-ship maneuvering board or signal drills, quizzing OOD's
unexpectedly on the status of the ECM or Sonar search or on
acoustic or engineering conditions, or inquiring about the
recognition features of reported contacts, are all ways of
increasing the OOD's perceived stress. There are many others,




C. WATCHSTANDER HEALTH AND PHYSICAL WELL-BEING
1. Illness, Coffee, Alcohol, Medication, and
Seasickness
Studies of the behavioral effects of infectious
diseases have shown (Alluisi, 1969) that the average perform-
ance efficiency of a crew can drop between 25 and 33 per cent
during a period of serious illness. This study also pointed
out that:
"of greater importance, however, is the extent of
the differences in the performance decrements exhibited by
different persons
—
persons who appear to be equally and fully
ill with the disease as judged clinically' and measured bio-
medically. One subject might show essentially no drop in
performance, whereas another subject's performance might drop
entirely to zero—the subject's having become essentially
non-responsive to the environment."
It is this great variation in individuals that the 00D must
be constantly sensitive to.
Coffee, a stimulant, tends to improve vigilance
performance and reduce the decrement over time. Depressant
drugs have been shown to impair vigilance performance in
numerous experiments—error rates have been increased and
detection rates have been reduced in both auditory and visual
tasks (Davies and Tune, 1969). Alcohol and Meclizine Hydro-
chloride (an anti-motion medication available aboard ship)
act as depressants and affect some individuals more than
others. Some people are sooner incapacitated by seasickness
or inoculations.
The shipboard environment places great stress on
individuals, and the 00D must be aware of the general physical
condition of each of his watchstanders. Individual adjustments
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may sometimes be required as a result of these conditions
in order to achieve the greatest overall efficiency.
2 . Snacks and Smoking
An important factor contributing to the watch-
stander's sense of well-being is authorization to eat
snacks or smoke. In at least one study, light snacks have
been shown to improve the vigilance performance of lookouts.
We have already mentioned the stimulating effects of coffee.
A study by Tarriere and Hartemann (1964) investigated the
effects of tobacco smoke on a visual vigilance task. This
work was extended by Davies and Tune (1969) who found that:
"When smokers were allowed to smoke during the
performance of a 150-minute visual vigilance task their
performance was significantly better than when smoking was
not permitted. The principal difference was in the amount of
decrement shown. When the performance of smokers was compared
with that of a group of non-smokers, the latter showed a
bigger deterioration in performance with time at work. Of the
3 groups tested, smokers who were permitted to smoke produced
the best performance, followed by non-smokers, and smokers
unable to smoke performed worst."
Johnston (1966) reported one study which showed that
inhaling smoke from two standard cigarettes decreased the
light sensitivity of the dark adapted eye slightly, and the
effect persisted for 15 to 30 minutes. Evidence was also
presented that smoking affects peripheral acuity, and that
peripheral acuity affects search performance. It appears
though that the adverse clincial effects of smoking are
insignificant when compared to the overall positive mental




Initially, this section on the Engineering Watch was to
have been fairly lengthy, and would have consisted mainly of
material on illumination, and noise/heat/vibration. After
researching these topics, it was found we could deal with
some of these aspects rather quickly. More importantly, the
emphasis was shifted to the significant human factor of
isolation, and concludes with a discussion of how the principle




Difficulties in measuring the psychophysiological cost of
work under varying levels of illumination and other factors
have led to disagreements as to applicable minimum standards
for different jobs. In a practical sense it does not seem
possible to achieve too great an ambient level of illumination
in any engineering space; in the absence of any definitive
study to the contrary and from a maintenance, operations, and
cleanliness standpoint the greater the level of illumination
in these spaces the better.
B. NOISE/HEAT/VIBRATION
1 . Cost and Nature of Hearing Damage
"Other than as a damaging agent to the ear and as a
masker of auditory information, noise will not harm the
organism or interfere with mental or motor performance."
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(Kryter, 1970). In the Navy, standards for equipment noise
are based on average damage thresholds and include, "HEL
Standard S-l-63, AFR 160-3, BuShips Specification S-l-10,
BUMEDINST 626O.6B, MIL-STD-7*iO , or MIL-A-8806, as applicable."
(COMOPTEVFORINST 3930. IF, 1970). Where these standards are
exceeded, a hearing protective device is required. Although
performance may not be decremented by noise in this limited
sense, the long term effects from exposure to damaging noise
are costly for the individual and his service. In 1970,
the Veterans Administration paid out $52 million in direct
compensation to hearing loss victims who had no other
disability. An unknown additional amount was paid to veterans
with hearing losses along with one or more other disabilities.
In that same year, hearing aids, batteries and hearing aid
repairs cost the VA another $1.4 million (Navy Times, 197*0.
Hearing impairment and deafness can be congenital or can be
caused by diseases, infections, combat wounds, other traumatic
injuries, or by malfunctions of the ear not noise-induced.
The biggest cause of hearing loss among military personnel is,
however, unprotected exposure to excessively loud noises.
Fortunately, it is also the hearing loss against which the
individual can best protect himself. Regrettably, too many
do not. According to Revell (197*0, a hearing disabled
Marine Corps veteran:
"Probably one big reason for. this lack of self-
protection is that men rarely see the consequences of it
until it is too late. I never saw dramatic, sudden deafness
in others, caused by some failure to protect their ears at
some specific time and place. It just doesn't happen that
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way. The fiddler gets paid later. An Air Force colonel
can't hear at age 45; he wore no ear protectors while a
machine gun instructor in his early 20 's. An Army veteran
began wearing a hearing aid this year at age 33; he didn't
protect his hearing as an Army tank crewman in the late
fifties. The examples go on, by the literal thousands, but
the people who haven't yet been damaged don't see these
disabled former non- (now true) believers in hearing
protection."
2. Shipboard Noise Hazards and Thumb Rules
Shipboard compliance with provisions of the Navy's
noise abatement and control program is typically manifested
by the presence of protective ear muffs on the helicopter
deck during flight operations, and an occasional sign
reading "Noise Hazardous Area" in some engineering space.
Most are familiar in principle with standard noise level
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Nearly all aircraft used by U.S. forces
generate noise above 85 dB, the ears-at-
rlsk point. All individual and crew-served
weapons in the U.S. inventory generate
noise at or above 120 dB, the threshold
of physical pain (Navy Times, 1974)
Virtually all noise-induced hearing damage is pre-
ventable with the protective devices now available. In
practice, good protectors reduce noise reaching the ear by
about 15 dB in the lower (not very harmful) frequencies,
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and by about 35 dB in the higher (extremely harmful) fre-
quencies. Since not all hazardous noise areas are marked,
and since noise-level meters which measure and define such
areas do not account for differences between individuals,
the Air Force has developed a helpful rule of thumb (Navy
Times, 1974):
For steady-level noise, "If talking with another
person requires the speaker to raise his voice to be under-
stood by a person one foot away, or to shout at three feet,
the noise is hazardous.
"The other kind of noise hazard, impulse noise,
doesn't lend itself to seat-of-the-pants measurement.
However, as a practical rule of thumb defense against the
most common military impulse noise, gunfire, consider it
all hazardous, even plinking .22 caliber rifles and pistols."
3. Hearing Protective Devices
Navy Times also discussed hearing protective devices
in use by the armed forces:
1. Reusable ear plugs : The two basic service-issued ear
plugs are the single-flange and triple-flange models. They
come in up to five sizes to fit different size ear canals,
are made of soft, preformed vinyl and are intended for
repeated use. They should be fitted to the individual ear
to be effective. Ear canal sizes vary between individuals
and even occasionally between a person's two ears. Properly
fitted plugs are snug but not uncomfortable.
2. Disposable ear plugs : Several versions are in the
supply system. One is made of wax-impregnated cotton. They
fit everyone and are intended for one-time use. Another
"disposable" plug is made by National Research Corporation,
which uses a foamed polymeric material with extraordinary
sound-absorbing properties. Trade-named "E-A-R Plug," it is
a . 6 by .7 inch compressible cylinder that can be rolled
between thumb and forefinger to about .2 inch. Inserted into
the ear canal, it expands in a few seconds to a snug fit in
any size ear. They can be washed and reused.
3. Ear muffs : Muffs are very similar to stereo head-
phones, but with much tighter seals against the head. They
attenuate slightly more sound energy than most plugs. In
steady-level noise above 120 dE, wearing both ear plugs and
muffs provides better protection than either device worn
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alone. Combined muffs and plugs do not provide better
protection against impulse-type noise, though. "Audio muffs"





Universal-fit ear plugs : This device fits all ears
because it is held in place with a headband. The only real
advantage is this universal fit.
5. Emergency protectors : If you get caught in hazardous
noise without plugs or muffs, stick a finger in each ear.
If you need your fingers for something else, try wet cotton,
as dry cotton is worthless . Cotton impregnated with wax also
is good. Any item that seals the external canal can be
helpful in an emergency.
Protective devices do not prevent hearing conversa-
tional sounds. The devices reduce the conversational (low)
frequencies only a little, while reducing the dangerous,
high-frequency sounds a lot. In a noise environment, you
frequently can hear those sounds you need to hear better if
you're wearing muffs or plugs. Exposure to noise has a
cumulative damaging effect on hearing, and the virile self-
image and fearless attitude manifested by shunning ear
plugs today will doom a person to forever fumbling with a
hearing aid in his senior years. Hospital Audiology Depart-
ments or any practicing otolaryngologist could provide names
of former military personnel residing in the local area who
might be willing to discuss their hearing-loss experiences
with the crew. In addition to the mechanical and electronic
adjustments, the psychological acceptance of a hearing aid
as a "life-time crutch" is often difficult; discussions with
such an individual might be enlightening to some crew members




Hearing impairment is often not obvious to the
afflicted individual, and others will detect a problem
before he perceives it himself. Due to various operational
circumstances, regular hearing examinations and audiograms
are often not performed, even on sonarmen where the require-
ment so clearly exists. Early hearing loss detection can be
a powerful incentive to begin a conscientious personal
hearing-protection program. Although permanent damage is
irrevocable, further damage can often be prevented. Navy
Times (197*0 provided some useful indicators of hearing loss:
Jj
. Shipboard Tests for Hearing Loss
a. Consonant discrimination : "The sound energy of
human speech is carried mainly in the low-frequency vowel
sounds. Comprehension, however, is carried in the low-energy,
high frequency sounds. Particularly troublesome for the
person with the high-frequency loss are the b, c, d, g, p, s,
t, v, and z sounds, the m and n sounds and combined letter
sounds, such as ch and sh. An inability to discriminate
readily between these consonant sounds can be a first
indication of a hearing problem. Try this list by having
someone read randomly while you don't watch the reader's
face: bill, chill, dill, drill, fill, frill, gill, grill,
hill, Jill, kill, mill, nil, pill."
b. Soundless aids : Some studies indicate that more
than 50 per cent of communication between persons comes
through nonverbal aids: body language, movements of the
mouth, lips, tongue, and throat, filling in the unheard
blanks based on the general context of the conversation,
anticipating what is coming next, and attitudes of the head,
hands, arms, and legs. A marginally-hearing person may fail




c. Built-in background : Most high-frequency loss
sufferers hear constant strange noises, a "ringing" in the
ears. Even persons with normal hearing sometimes have the
problem, brought on by colds, or trauma. Hearing speech
through this ringing can be difficult in an otherwise quiet
environment.
d. Feminine voices : Soft, relatively high-frequency
feminine voices are difficult for high-frequency-loss victims.
e. Articulation : "Another manifestation of hearing
loss is indistinctness of the victim's articulation. Spoken
sounds are repetitions of sounds heard. A hard-of-hearing
person doesn't hear some of the hard consonants, forgets the
sounds or remembers and believes he's pronouncing them, and
leaves them out of his speech. He may pronounce pit, for
example, leaving off most or all of the hard, plosive p.
It may come out bit or even it."
f. Body language : "Finally, the partially-deaf
person's own body language can reveal his problem. He may
regularly turn his ear, the best one if there's a difference,
toward the person he's trying to understand. He may cup his
ear with a hand in the universal I-can' t-hear-you signal.
He may watch a speaker's mouth, instead of maintaining the
more common eye contact."
Any of these signals should be interpreted as a requirement
for competent medical examination.
5. Effects of Noise, Temperature, and Vibration
on Performance
In studies where a relationship between noise and
performance is claimed (For example: Lawton, 1972), this can
be taken as due to psychological factors related to stimulus
and response contingencies as associated with the noise by
the individual. It Is generally the nature of the individual,
and not the nature of the noise, which determines performance
in the presence of noise. Bregman and Pearson (19 72) find:
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"Man has demonstrated a unique potential to perform tasks in
the presence of noise, and frequently shows an amazing
ability to adapt to, or apparently ignore, forms of noise
in his home and work environments. Research from our
laboratory .. .has shown wide individual differences in
attitudes toward noise and in sensitivity to common noise
sources.
"
An experiment in an operational environment looked at the
combined effects of noise, temperature, and vibration (Loeb
and Jeantheau, 1958). Four conditions were studied:
a. Control condition : moderate noise and heat,
no vibration
b. Noise and Vibration : noise and vibration
considerable, temperature moderate
c. Heat condition : heat rather intense, noise
moderate, no vibration
d. Heat, Noise, and Vibration : noise, vibration,
and heat levels rather high.
The Summary of Results concluded,
"Noise and vibration. . .appreciably increased the median
response times of the subjects. Further decrement occurred
when heat was combined with noise and vibration, but the
effect was relatively transitory. Heat alone had no
apparent effect. Changes occurring as a function of elapsed
time were not apparent."
C. ISOLATION AND KNOWLEDGE OF RESULTS
1. Small Group Psychology
Through an unfortunate combination of circumstances
including physical remoteness, unavailability of information,
aptitude, and probably even disinterest, the typical engi-
neering watchstander performs the routine duties of his watch
in relative isolation. Whether by choice or chance, he
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probably has less knowledge about the immediate operations
of the ship he mans than anyone else on boajrd, lookouts and
messcooks included. He may at times share the companionship
of a small group of fellow watchstanders; but this is of
little comfort today and will be of less help in the future.
Consider the following from Shipmate (1973):
"The Navy's first gas turbine destroyer was launched
on 10 November at Pascagoula, Miss USS SPRUANCE (DD-963)
is the first of 30 destroyers of this class, six of which
are now under construction, the first major* combatant type
to use gas turbines for propulsion. The high degree of
automation of this power plant is a significant factor in
the low nur.be r of men (250) planned for assignment to
Spruance class DD's."
When we have at last reduced the engineering watch to that
single irreducible man, cost-benefit and manpower-utilization
studies will unquestionably show that we have achieved new
and better efficiencies in operating our ships. The feeling
of isolation experienced by that remaining man, similar to
feelings shared by small groups of watchstanders now, will
not be quantified. The "errors" he makes, the deterioration
in performance that is very likely to occur, these things
will simply become problems for local commands to solve.
Fortunately, the problem is neither new nor unsolvable.
The study of small groups seems to encounter almost
insurmountable methodological obstacles when attempted in
the laboratory. Given the proliferation of variables deter-
mined to influence individual and group behavior and the
often conflicting results generated by studies examining
only one or a few aspects of group behavior, there are
serious limitations of the laboratory in providing complete
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information about long-duration, complex interactions from
brief investigations of highly restricted subject populations
Studying small group performance under conditions of isola-
tion becomes even more fragile. Hopefully, future research
will involve the systematic study of natural groups over
time (Helmreich, Bakeman, and Scherwitz, 1973). Motivation
for much of the older literature on sensory deprivation and
social isolation were reports about American POWs in Korea
who were reputedly subjected to similar conditions (Myers,
1961; Army Leadership Human Research, 1962; Myers, and
others, 1962, 1966; Smith, Myers, and Murphy, 1963; Myers,
Smith, and Murphy, 197D. Similar studies with perhaps
greater applied value address the problems of isolation
and confinement aboard submarines and Sealab (cf., Levine,
1958, a, b; Radloff and Helmreich, 1968). The latest genera-
tion of available literature deals with the human factors
in jet and long-duration spaceflight (Sells and Berry, 196l;
Townes, 1972). Much of this information is applicable to
the destroyer environment.
Townes discusses the problems of groups in
isolation:
Data cited "suggests that time may be a highly
relevant variable in the perception of superordinate goals
(i.e., goals that are compelling for all group members but
that require interdependent activity for attainment) and
that a strong tendency exists for progressive social with-
drawal and Individuation in conditions of long-term group
isolation and confinement. Since systematic studies of iso-
lated groups have been limited to relatively short durations,
it is not known how far this process goes. . .However the
possibility must be considered that a mutual withdrawal and
encapsulation process may proceed over time to such a point
that superordinate goals and interdependencies are
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de-emphasized to the extent that they no longer maintain
group viability. In the light of current knowledge regarding
the importance of feedback in adaptative systems or of
reinforcement in behavior modification, it can be safely
presumed that adaptative interpersonal relations will depend
on interpersonal communication, whether verbal or otherwise.
This process of social withdrawal and individual encapsula-
tion seems very likely to impair appropriate interpersonal
communication.
"It has been observed both anecdotally and in labora-
tory studies that in socially isolated groups the degree to
which men seek and obtain stimulation in the form of inter-
personal information may in itself create problems in that
men become "overexposed" to each other (Byrd, 1930; Smith, S. 3
1969; Altman and Haythorn, 1965). This overexposure may
result fron an accelerated rate of information exchange
relative to the rate at which group members are able to
develop shared values, behavioral expectations, and belief
systems. ..An accelerated rate of information exchange may
produce interpersonal stress which in turn produces or at
least is accompanied by social withdrawal and encapsulation,
thereby heightening the degree of stimulus reduction.
"One might expect that a program of stimulus enrich-
ment could be easily designed to offset these effects of
stimulus reduction. . .any stimulus-enrichment program for a
long-term period would have to provide stimuli that were
both novel and significant to the individual." Self-
actualization is a term which involves adaptation to what is
seen as a meaningful and important life. Stimulus must be
provided so that the individual "fits his niche, so to
speak, bringing his interests, skills, and personality
predispositions into play in ways that are intrinsically
satisfying to him.
"It seems unlikely that such individuals (groups in
isolation) would readily find opportunities for self-
actualization simply as passengers on a long-duration mission
during most of which time they have little or nothing of an
actively useful nature to accomplish. So-called "Mickey
Mouse" tasks would not provide the realistic challenge such
individuals may require to maintain their active orientation
to reality. . .The goal here is to provide a realistic,
challenging task that will keep crew members meaningfully
involved in interdependent activities directed toward a
superordinate goal. The mission itself constitutes a super-
ordinate goal... but does not require a high degree of inter-
dependent activity en route.
"Educational and recreational opportunities would,
of course, facilitate long-term viability .. .News from (home)
will be important to the crew, not only because of their
interest in what is going on but as a relief from the
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monotony of the mission. Communications will permit inclu-
sions of (those at home) in the psychological life-space of
the crew. Crew members will not be entirely dependent for
all social contacts upon other crew members: they should
receive considerable social support from... their families...
"It seems that the long-term viability of the human
group under such conditions will be intimately related to
...the degree to which a challenging task and meaningful
variety of stimuli can be provided, and the effectiveness
with which procedures can be designed to maintain inter-
dependent activity on the part of crew members directed
toward superordinate goals.
"It is recommended that a systems-analysis approach
be applied to study and redefine the human-factors require-
ments... All the elements of the long-duration mission, inclu-
ding its (predeployment ) and (post-deployment leave and
upkeep) portions, should be considered together as a totally
integrated and mutually reinforcing system."
2. Education, Physical Fitness, Morale
In many important ways, these observations of small
group needs help to reinforce traditional practices. The
Navy's Program for Afloat College Education (PACE: NavPers
15229) provides educational opportunities. Chief of Naval
Operations (1973) provides for general military training
which includes clear and challenging health/fitness instruc-
tions for shipboard personnel. Physical fitness programs
have become a corporate trend; Exxon and Phillips Petroleum
have well publicized stateside programs, Japanese employers
have similar requirements. Where performance can be measured
by earnings, it is not difficult to justify expenditures for
health/fitness maintenance. In laboratory tests, exercise
programs have contributed towards physical fitness with
attendent improvement in psychomotor reaction times, and
decrease in degree of anxiety, depression, and hostility
(cf., Lambert and Parrlsh, 1972; Phelan and Parodi, 1971).
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Efforts to provide challenging tasks and stimulus-
enrichment on board ship are never-ending. The Commanding
Officer's "only collateral duty" is frequently that of
"Morale Officer." Cruise-books, ship's newspapers, the
library, smokers, and movies (Cope and Bucknell, 1966)
satisfy many of our needs. Mail, Family-grams, and when
authorized even radio-telephone relays help to keep us in
contact with our families. Occasionally an innovation
attracts wide attention, as was the case with Reduced
Manning (Destroyer Development Group, 1973).
3. Reduced Manning
A recent newspaper article quotes: "Navy Still
Studying 5-Man Watch Team—Purpose of the test is to develop
'watch team esprit' and ultimately reduce shipmanning.
"
(Navy Times, 10 October 1973). The premise is that perfor-
mance gains achieved by manning the bridge with highly
cohesive groups will offset the losses due to reduced
resources. In reality, "watch team esprit" will exist
pretty much in the form that it does today, as long as the
goals, aspirations, and relationships that motivate the teams
remain unchanged (Kurke, 1962). Although some Commanding
Officers have instituted successful team-building initiatives
(Destroyer Development Group, 1973) it is primarily the
addition of the automatic-bell loggers, steering devices,
fog-signal timers, and special communications gear plus
economic necessity which allows the reductions In manpower.
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However, installation and acceptance of this
automatic equipment without regard for the attendant human
factors problems will inevitably lead to operational
inefficiencies or failures. The necessity of revising both
the human and non-human elements of the system was pointed
out by Naval Ship Research and Development (1969):
"Before the ultimate goal of minimum manning levels
are possible or unmanned machinery spaces can be realized in
the Naval Service, an intermediate phase must transpire.
Several factors will highlight this phase, one being general
acceptance and a buildup of confidence in the automation
concept at all levels of the Naval establishment. The
second factor will be a gradual improvement in the perfor-
mance, quality, reliability, and arrangement of the control
systems themselves. The third factor deals with personnel
capability, which must be upgraded through revised concepts




A factor that went unidentified in the preceding
discussion of groups in isolation yet was tacitly acknow-
ledged as absolutely vital to mission viability was
"knowledge of results." In the shipboard environment,
knowledge of results is provided through many channels;
morning quarters, casual personal encounters, announcements
in the Plan-Of-The-Day , recognition at inspections, presenta-
tion of awards, and surreptitiously in "shipping-over"
discussions and during career counseling (Meshi, and others
1972; Holoter, and others, 1973)- These last two references
are a description of the Navy career counseling process, and
a report of findings based on a large sample of the Navy
enlisted population. These findings stressed the need for
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"practical techniques for Improving organizational effec-
tiveness, and for creating a more favorable social envelope
within which the individual Navyman can liwe and work..."
Chief of Naval Operations (1972a) in a move to increase
counseling effectiveness increased the number of full-time
career counseling billets to all sea commands having more
than 200 enlisted members.
In addition to such full time counselors, every
leadership billet in the navy carries with it the inherent
requirement that an incumbent be an effective counselor.
Modern techniques encourage active involvement between the
counselor and the counseled, and give the counselor a
perhaps unique opportunity to bolster the individual's
personal feelings of worth and contribution. This is a
broader interpretation of "knowledge of results" or
"feedback" than is usually allowed, however it is important
not to view counseling as simply a technique to improve
retention. Counseling viewed in the context of the total
Command, and conducted in a way compatible with overall
Command objectives, can be expected to have a significant
positive effect on performance. An important "lesson
learned" from the campus disturbances which began at
Berkeley in late 1966, and expanded to the protest of
50 thousand demonstrators at the Pentagon on 21 October 1967 }
was how relatively ineffective our then existing student
development and counseling techniques really were. The
dissenting young who joined in these protests yesterday are
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In the Navy today; the bulk of the enlisted men assigned to
our modern guided missile destroyers are 19-21 years of age
(Pinney, 1967). The procedures that were found useful in
restoring order to the campuses then are applicable to us
now. Layton, Sandeen, and Baker (1971) summarize these
lessons:
"In recognition of the need to help students develop,
college counseling centers are gradually giving up their
passive and reactive roles isolated from the mainstream of
student life and are changing into student growth and
development centers with the focus on the educational and
developmental tasks in addition to the traditional remedial
functions (Levy, 1969; Foulds and Guinan, 1969; Lipsman,
1969). Carey (1969) stated that student protests indicate
that counseling has been ineffective in that the individual
student's needs have not been met satisfactorily. He said
that the counselor should be the listener of students and
learn of their attitudes, values, and needs before the stu-*.
dents take indirect ways through demonstrations and violence
to indicate what their needs are. Such listening will
necessitate the counselor moving out of his office to where
the action is and feeding the information gained into proper
administrative channels so that change can occur. Lawton
(1970) and Calia (1966) ahve also emphasized the need to
move out."
5 . Techniques and Results of Feedback
Perhaps one of the most direct and effective sources
of feedback to the crew in general, and to the engineering
watchstander in particular, is the Ship's Announcing System
(IMC). When desired, it can be directed to this group
exclusively. The Engineering Officer of the Watch has
available an equivalent system for these spaces, but more
often it is not amplified to be heard by all watchstanders
.
Indiscriminate use of the IMC in these spaces can be annoying,
and under some circumstances dangerous; but when used with
discretion and a great deal more regularity than is common
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today, there is little doubt that the IMC can be an important
source of reinforcement for this group. A "tremendous boost
in morale" was noted in a widely published Destroyer Squadron
Commander's letter (Wolfe and Mulholland, I960) where there
was "a continuing effort by ship's officers to keep the crew
"cut in" on what was going on and why— including blow-by-blow
accounts of ASW actions via the public address system."
Feedback does not have to be of an informative or even truly
factual nature to be effective.
Mackworth (1950), for example, in- one of the studies
in his classic series, called each subject by telephone
midway during the watch period to ask him to "do even better
for the rest of the test." Performance, which had shown a
substantial decrement before the telephone message, recovered
to a level higher than initial levels. Similar effects have
been observed in countless laboratory studies examining
feedback. Direct knowledge-of-results is one important type
of feedback, and there are variations (Fitts and Posner,
1967). The following typical experiments may provide some
feeling for the subject:
1. McCormack (1959) in measuring response times to a
light stimulus with and without knowledge of results, found
"response time increased significantly throughout the duration
of the task, this increase being more pronounced under the
no-knowledge than under the knowledge condition."
2. Baker (1960a) in a study of radar operators found that
providing knowledge of results by voice over head-phones
improved performance
.
3. Jensen, Tilton, and Anderson (1961), observing the
crew at a radar station in the United States, conducted
experiments that indicated "knowledge of results and
discussions contribute to improvements in performance by
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helping to develop understanding of the environment and
common modes of response among members of a group."
H
. Baker, C. H. (1961) in a vigilance task maintained
performance at a high level by giving knowledge of results
concerning performance of a peripheral vigilance task which
was undertaken concurrently.
5. Weidenfeller, Baker, and Ware (1962) in an experiment
involving monitoring of a simple visual display where know-
ledge of results (KR), "false" knowledge of results (PKR),
and an irrelevant stimulus (IS) were provided to different
groups found no significant difference in performance by the
IS group over a control group, but found both the KR and FKR
groups significantly higher by the same amounts.
6. Sipowicz, Ware, and Baker (1962) investigated groups
monitoring an interrupted light source under isolated
conditions with KR, monetary reward, or both, and concluded
that all experimental groups were significantly better than
the control group. The combination of reward and KR produced
the highest level of performance, however '"the effectiveness
of reward is highly dependent upon the manner in which it is
used."
7- Hardesty, Trumbo, and Bevan (1963), in a modified
Mackworth Clock Test, observed the effects of observer-
presented KR, machine-presented KR, and the physical
presence or absence of an observer with the subject. "On
the initial test day, groups with no knowledge of results
and machine-presented knowledge of results showed the typical
decrement function throughout the session. In contrast,
subjects receiving verbal knowledge of results from the
experimenter showed less decrement and a significantly higher
over-all performance . The superiority of the groups receiving
the verbal report persisted on the two subsequent test days
despite the fact that all extrinsic knowledge of results
was withdrawn on these tests. Observer-presented knowledge
of results facilitated performance regardless of the physical
presence or absence of the observer in the test cubicle."
8. Ware and Baker (1964) attempted to determine which
method of presenting KR (verbal or nonverbal) seemed to have
the greatest effect on performance for auditory and visual
vigilance tasks. In terms of detection performance, they
found "verbal KR was superior to nonverbal, auditory superior
to visual, and KR for misses superior to KR for detections.
When KR was presented verbally, response category made no
difference in performance level, but knowledge of missed
signals, when presented nonverbally, was significantly higher
than knov/ledge of detected signals."
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9. Mackworth (196^) found that the performance decrement
over time in vigilance, threshold, and high-speed perceptual
motor tasks can be prevented in both active and passive tasks
by knowledge of results.
10. Antonelli and Karas (1967) investigated the effects
of both true and false knowledge of results in experiments
involving the monitoring of a display panel. The results
demonstrated that "groups receiving KR do not differ signi-
ficantly in performance from groups receiving FKR. The best
results were obtained at the 100% feedback level." A perform-
ance drop of about 25% occurred when only 50% feedback was
provided.
The moral for destroyer operations is plain. Provide feed-
back in all its many guises, as frequently as possible, with
all the ingenuity at your command. Optimum performance will




A. FATIGUE AND SLEEP LOSS
Under laboratory conditions, a differentiation can
perhaps be made between the physiological and psychological
aspects of fatigue. in terms of characteristic muscle and
brain electrical 'fingerprints 1 (Lloyd, Voor, and Thieman,
1968). Aboard ship we are more interested in how fatigue
and sleep loss effects overall performance. The question of
what per cent of a certain performance decrement is physio-
logical and what per cent is psychological is largely moot.
Just how difficult it is in the field to make such distinc-
tion is evident in the findings of Wilkinson (1964) who
studied the effects of up to 60 hours of sleep deprivation
on different types of work and concluded:
"The effects of sleep deprivation upon performance vary
widely with the nature of the work being carried out. In
the present study impairment was almost complete towards the
end of 20 min repetitive serial responding and 30 min
inspection work (vigilance). On the other hand, tactical
decision making of a complex, but absorbing and realistic
nature was completely unaffected by the same degree of
stress even towards the end of one hour's continuous work.
What are the features of a task which determine whether its
performance will be impaired by loss of sleep or not? Two
are suggested. A task will be vulnerable to sleep depriva-
tion (1) as it is complex, and (2) as it is lacking in
interest, incentive and reward. Of the two factors, that of
incentive may be the more influential, such that a highly
complex task may be little affected by sleep deprivation if
it is complex in an interesting or rewarding way."
Sleep is not a continuous steady state, and with the
advent of modern techniques for sleep monitoring and data
processing there has been a tremendous amount of nev; infor-
mation made available on the cyclic nature of sleep stages
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and the mental, biochemical, and physiological activity that
occurs during sleep. One result of the increased study in
this area has been to correct the old belief that extensive
sleep deprivation would inevitably result in marked behavioral
changes, often including hallucinations and paranoid delusions,
Johnson (1967) reported effects observed in total sleep loss
experiments
:
"Although one subject was kept awake for 264 hours, no
marked psychological changes occurred. Other studies
reported only minor changes after 200 and 125 hours of sleep
loss. Whether sleep loss will result in psychological
changes appears to depend upon the age of the subject (the
younger subject has more resistance), his psychological and
physical health before the ordeal, and the expectations and
support given by his environment.
"Sleep loss, however, does produce changes in performance,
with the nature and extent of such changes depending upon
several factors. After prolonged sleep deprivation, the
primary impairment takes the form of lapses. The subject
is unable to maintain efficient behavior and increasingly
experiences short periods when performance falters or stops.
In general, when he can control the display of stimuli and
the rate at which he will respond, his performance suffers
less. Speed may be impaired but accuracy will be maintained.
However, in work-paced tasks where the subject cannot control
the time of appearance or duration of the stimulus display
and must respond quickly, lapses will cause an increase in
errors of omission.
"Under acute sleep loss, sending orders (a subject-paced
task) results in fewer errors than receiving and sending out
orders (work-paced task). Tasks with strong incentive
qualities and of brief duration suffer less than tasks which
are long and repetitive in nature. Immediate knowledge of
results helps to overcome the effects of sleep loss. It is
also well established that performance during the sleep loss
period follows a diurnal cycle: the best performance usually
occurs in the evening and the poorest around dawn."
Performance degradation due to sleep loss is affected not
only by individual differences and the nature of the task,
but also by the nature and length of sleep obtained. Fairly
wide publicity of early demonstrations that sleep can be
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divided into cyclical stages (Dement and Kleitman, 1957) and
popular interest in the apparent relationships between rapid
eye movements (REM) and dream recall, has led to the rather
widely held and largely erroneous belief that sleep inter-
ruptions, by themselves, somehow deny the body some of
sleep's restorative or recuperative function. Since much of
shipboard sleep is interrupted sleep, research conclusions
from specific studies in this area are particularly germane.
Johnson, and others (1970) analyzed data from subjects who
had undergone total sleep deprivation for two consecutive
nights, and were allowed to recover by either:
1. Uninterrupted recovery sleep for five nights.
2. Two nights of REM deprivation and then three nights
of uninterrupted recovery sleep (this REM deprived group was
allowed all non-rem sleep).
3. Two nights of slow-wave sleep deprivation and then
three nights of uninterrupted sleep.
A fourth group was allowed approximately eight hours of
uninterrupted sleep every night, with no initial sleep
deprivation whatsoever.
Findings were summarized as follows:
"Performance on the Wilkinson addition test, auditory
vigilance, X crossout test, Williams immediate word recall
test, and the mental adding test (plus 7)> deteriorated
significantly during total sleep loss. Fewer signals were
detected on the vigilance task, fewer additions were attempted,
fewer words were scanned on the crossout test, and fewer words
were recalled in the memory test. Accuracy in all tasks
tended to decrease as sleep loss increased.
"All subjects improved after the first night of recovery
sleep. There was no significant difference in the amount of
recovery for the three kinds of recovery sleep."
This finding suggests that the oft heard counsel "Don't wake
the Captain, he's been up all night," is without substance.
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Such interruptions apparently have no significant effect on
sleep recovery, however arousal from partially adequate sleep
can lead to very poor performance as will be seen.
Morgan and Alluisi (1972) conducted research to determine
"the length of time (hours, days, weeks) a unit can perform
its primary mission effectively before it must be relieved,
plus the length of time before it is operationally ready for
commitment again." One of the principal results of this
research has been increased awareness of the effects of
temporal variables such as work-rest schedules, sleep-
wakefulness cycles, circadian rhythms, continuous work, and
sleep loss on work behavior or sustained performance.
(Circadian rhythm is the typical diurnal cycle of biological
processes manifested by changes in respiration rate, oxygen
consumption, gastrointestinal activity, heart rate, body
temperature, blood pressure and many other metabolic functions.
Performance has a very similar variation as earlier demon-
strated by Kleitman (1939), Hauty and Payne (1958), and
Murray, Williams, and Lubin (1958): Bennet , Degan, and
Spiegel, 1963). It was observed in the course of this
research that regardless of the work-rest schedules adopted
(i.e., 4-2 work-rest, 4-4 work-rest), that the worst perform-
ance always came at the end of the sleep-loss or continuous-
work day. "In the case of each subject, the very worst
performance was obtained after the sleep-loss period had
ended; i.e., it occurred during the first duty period
following the inadequate four or two hours sleep of the
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subjects who had been awake for 44 or 40 hours, respectively.
In the case of the ... (subjects) .. .who had been given a
24 hour rest period, the best performance occurred during
the first work period after the sleep-loss stress." The
recommendation from this is: "If men have endured a stress-
ful period of sleep loss then gone to sleep, one had better
not awaken them for duty prior to their having obtained ade-
quate sleep unless one is prepared to expect very low
performance efficiency."
1. Effect on Memory
Sleep loss also appears to have a degrading effect
on man's short term memory. Williams, Gieseking, and Lubin
(1966) found significant impairment after one night of sleep
loss in the ability to immediately recall word lists. A
similar recognition test 24-hours after a one night sleep
loss, however, showed no significant deficit. Since in the
normal course of operations watchstanders and others will
perform their duties under various conditions of fatigue and
sleep deprivation, information processing and display systems
should be designed to compensate for failures in man's short
term memory. Even under the most favorable of circumstances
we may seriously overestimate memory capability, or fail to
allow for very significant differences between individuals.
Small individually maintained "status boards," or hand held
"cheat sheets" should not necessarily be discouraged or
viewed with disdain. What should be most important is the
individuals total performance, and if he seems to do better
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with some innovative "help," then he should be praised.
According to Hind (1967):
"Operators should not be required to remember impor-
tant information, because they have inherently a large
long-term memory but poor speed and accuracy of recall of
information. Therefore, aids for recall or factual display
of important information should be provided as necessary,
the information being released when no longer required."
2. Sleep Control Methods
Adequate sleep seems to be beneficial for many
reasons. Nevertheless, sleep-inducing drugs should be used
with great caution and reluctance because of side effects.
This problem was studied by Townes (1972) who advised:
"A more promising and healthful approach, not only
to the control and attainment of optimal sleep but also to
the regulation of waking states of relaxation and alertness
when needed, is through conditioning and learning techniques.
These procedures should be directed toward control of physi-
cal, physiological, and mental states involving muscular
relaxation and regulation of activity of the central and
autonomic nervous systems. Where sleep cannot be regulated
properly, the effects of sleep loss must be combatted by
countermeasures. . .these would include exercise, frequent
changes of tasks, frequent rest periods, (and provisions
for arousal if circumstances require)."
3. Work-Rest Cycles
An advantage that the military reader often enjoys
over the civilian researcher in the area of watch schedules
and work-rest cycles is that the former frequently has first
hand knowledge gained through years of watchstanding on his
own under a multitude of conditions, and the later has only
imperfect data collected from a limited number of subjects
(who may not be representative) under very particular cir-
cumstances (which may not be applicable to the present case).
Extrapolating from laboratory data which attempts to answer
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questions such as: "How much sleep is needed?" and "What
is the best watch schedule?" to the world of destroyer opera-
tions would be possible, but the constraints and "subject
to" caveats which would be errected around such an answer
would probably obscure the general principles which we are
looking for.
In an analysis of work-rest schedules in continuous
operations, Morgan and Alluisi (1972) have drawn from a great
wealth of studies of sustained performance conducted over
various conditions by numerous investigators with different
backgrounds and approaches. Their conclusion from this
study was:
"Performance efficiency can be maintained at a high
level with men working as much as 12 hours a day on a 4-4
schedule, if other conditions are arranged appropriately.
Previous indications of increased efficiency's being obtained
with eight hour work days relative to longer ten or twelve
hour work days apply to the conditions in which off-duty
time must be spent in ... "housekeeping" functions . .
.
"For short periods of time, in emergencies, and when
extra-curricular demands are reduced or ignored, there is
no question concerning man's abilities to work 12 or 16 hours
per day, and with a maintenance of high levels of performance
efficiencies. As part of the job of planning for the effi-
cient, satisfying, and honorable employment; of man we will
certainly have to consider work-rest scheduling, durations
of work within day, week, month, and longer periods, and
the extra-curricular "housekeeping" demands made on all of
us."
This was consistent with the earlier findings of Alluisi
and Coates (1969)
:
1. "Man can probably follow a 4-4 work-rest schedule
for very long periods without detriment to his performance.
2. "For shorter periods of two or possibly four weeks,
selected men can follow a more demanding 4-2 work-rest




3. "In following the more demanding schedule, man uses
up his performance reserve and so is less able to meet the




"The diurnal rhythm which Is evidenced in physiolog-
ical measures may also be evidenced in performance depending
on the information given to, and the motivation of, the
subjects, and depending also on the total work load; even
where motivation is sufficiently high, the cycling may be
demonstrated when the operator is overloaded."
k . Watch Schedules
It was in consideration of work-rest cycle optimiza-
tion that Stolgitis (1969) analyzed the traditional Navy
watch system and a proposed alternative. The Traditional
watch is utilized by virtually all units of the surface Navy,
and consists of a four hour watch (followed by eight hours
off, or 4/8), with the 1600-2000 split into two "dog-watches"
of nearly equal length. The Proposed Alternative was the ...
less common six hour watch system (followed by twelve hours
off, or 6/12) adopted in the past by crew preference aboard
USS TECUMSEH (SSBN-628), USS STONEWALL JACKSON (SSBN-63^),
USS DANIEL BOONE (SSBN-629), USS ULYSSES S. GRANT (SSBN-63D,
USS SKIPJACK (SSN-585), and selected watches aboard USS
JOUETT (DLG-29), to name only a few.
The basic assumptions of the Stolgitis analysis,
based on a large body of supportive evidence which was cited
and generally consistent with present theories on fatigue
and sleep were:
1. "The fatigue differential caused by the additional
two hours between four hour and six hour watches is not
significant
.
2. "The performance decrement as pertains to vigilance
does hot disappear with less than three hours of sleep.
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3. "A minimum of five hours sleep is required to enable




"The physical and psychological recovery from sleep
loss is accomplished by the acquisition of a normal un-
interrupted sleep period."
In conclusion, "An analysis of the 4/8 and 6/12 watch
schedules has indicated the 6/12 system to be the better
system for providing adequate sleep periods. It achieves
this goal by establishing longer uninterrupted hours of
sleep for the individual. With the 4/8 schedule, the
longest non-watch period is 8 hours. Within this length of
time, the sailor must allocate time for ship's work, meals,
personal hygiene, social activities, etc. It is immediately
clear that a normal 8 hour sleep is not possible with the
above constraints. The 6/12 schedule by virtue of its
12 hour periods of non-watch provides a greater opportunity
for the individual to accomplish his necessary duties and
also allot time for sleep that is closer to the 8 hour norm
than the 4/8 schedule. It is this characteristic of the
6/12 schedule that makes it preferential."
Not only was the 6/12 watch schedule viewed prefer-
able from the standpoint of providing adequate sleep periods,
but the inference was drawn from the crew preferences for
the 6/12 schedule that in this case "what is preferred by
the individual is "best" in that it will lead to higher
levels of morale and performance, and these traits are
certainly the best means to the achievement of the military
mission." This is a subjective view; but 6/12 and perhaps
other alternate watch schedules could be considered and
perhaps attempted in an effort to improve human performance.
B. EQUIPMENT ALTERATIONS
Specific shipboard alterations or modifications are
often considered which may have some human factor advantages.
Whether approval or disapproval of such proposals is made at
the local level, or a recommendation is passed to some higher
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level, the safety of the men and equipment affected by the
alteration is often of paramount concern. The following
discussion of the safety ramifications issuing from
various proposals to improve a submarine depth gauge instal-
lation has broad applicability in the destroyer environment
(Madison, 1972):
"Submarine safety, like gunnery laws, is written largely
in the blood of individuals who have gone before in an
unsafe manner. Time has obscured many of these lessons, and
the particular safety features of a design remain for years
after, seemingly without reason, but to be fully appreciated
when the casualty which introduced the precaution reappears.
So it is that the human factors designer must be alert not
to remove such designed in safety merely to make what he
believes will be a better system, or one more suitably
adapted to the human factor requirements. The choice
between placing a certain depth gauge in an area of the most
acute perception by the 00D, or of placing it more remotely
in a difficult to see area, might be made in favor of the
later area once it is pointed out that during a crash dive
three people must jump through the 'favorable' area, and a
gauge placed there would almost certainly cause serious
personnel injury.
"In the same way, piping changes, rate instruments,
differential pressure detectors, and new alarms installed
with the most admirable intentions of improving the man-
machine relationship to achieve better system depth control
performance might have just the opposite effect. Adding
depth gauge piping increases the probability of a flooding
casualty, since you now have a greater surface area exposed
to the full pressure of the outside sea. Adding new equip-
ment reduces the room available in which to maintain the
old equipment, increases the system maintenance requirements
perhaps at the detriment of a more important system, and
actually increases the likelihood that a failure will occur.
Generally, the simpler a system the less likely it is to
fail. New alarms require new training and familiarization
by all personnel who work in the area where response to the
alarm is required. A man from a ship on which the alarm is
not yet installed might become confused and commit an unsafe
act on a supposedly identical ship which does have the alarm.
"In the case of maintenance it is by no means enough to
simply install a reliable depth gauge. What is required is
a gauge that, working in concert with the human operators,
achieves the most complete integration in the total system,
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and contributes to a maximum extent to the mission goal
while having a minimum import on the man. No human factors
improvement can be considered so 'obvious' that it can be
installed and forgotten. Safety in human factors design
is the sum of many factors, some intangible and difficult
to quantify."
Even if equipment was once installed embodying the very
best in human factor design features, and that equipment has
been satisfactorily used for years, it is not always true
that the same man-machine relationships exist today. Alter-
ations or improvements to outdated equipments are often
possible and desirable. Assignment decisions relative to
man-machine functions are always made at some point in time,
and relative to a particular state of development of
engineering science. Chapanis (I960) observed,
"not so very many years ago, a question about the
allocation of computing functions to the human or to a
machine would have been meaningless. Computers for
performing this kind of function have only recently become
possible. Similarly, although it is essentially meaningless
now to ask whether a machine sensing device should be used
to recognize targets, this question may not be meaningless
twenty years from now."
In cases where a need for improvement or alteration
appears to exist, the following checklist, presented in the
form of a set of questions, may help to solidify thought on
the subject (adapted from Van Cott and Kinkade, 1972):
1. Human Engineering Checklist for Equipment Alterations
1. Why is the alteration being sought?
What mission will the system be expected to fulfill?
More particularly, what is this modified system
expected to do that the existing systems are not
doing or are not doing well enough?
2. How is the system to fulfill its mission?
What are the stages of mission execution?




3. In what environments must the system function?
What particular hazards will obtain?
What stresses or demands are likely to be placed on
the system?
4. Who will benefit by system operation?
Who will use the system?
What kinds and numbers of operator and/or maintenance
personnel are available?
5. What are the major technological options?
What alternative configurations are feasible?
What particular resource or class of resource is most
crucial to prospective system effectiveness?
6. What functions should be assigned to human operator
and support personnel?
What conditions will impose peak task loads on the
operator or operators?
What conditions (e.g., long periods of inactivity)
will tend to degrade operator performance?
What pattern of decision/action will occur at crucial
periods?
7. What information is required by operators (and/or
support personnel) in order to fulfill their
functions?
What is the probable pattern of channels and flow
rate for this information?
In what form (i.e., voice, audible alarm, written
format) will the information be most useful to
the operator?
8. How many people are needed to man and support the
system under normal and peak load conditions?
What special skills, capabilities or attributes are
needed for effective operator performance?
What special training, if any, will be required?
Is such training feasible?
What resources will be required to implement the
training?
9. How should the assigned functions be distributed
among operator and support personnel?
How should the work stations be arranged?
What instrumentation is required at each work station?
How should this instrumentation be laid out?
10. What specific devices, tools, or controls are most
appropriate to the pattern of task actions that
will be imposed on operator and support personnel?
What kinds of aids, guides, indicators, locks, inter-
locks, cover plates, etc. would be useful to




What means are available to allow quick recovery or
to maintain the safety and integrity of the system
in the event of operator error or failure?
11. What options are available for eliminating, combining,
or simplifying any of the instrumentation?
12. What safeguards, if any, are required to insure ad-
herence to the design plan and functional
requirements of the system?
What quality control procedures are required to
insure the validity of human factors considerations
in the final product?
13- What will be the effect, if any, on human performance,
safety, or morale of any proposed changes in
configuration or instrumentation?
14. By what means can test and evaluation be made as
realistic as possible in terms of the ultimate
operator and support personnel and in terms of
the operational conditions?
15. What criteria of system and operator performance are
logical in terms of the mission and functions
assigned?
What measurement procedures will yield data which
are valid with respect to such criteria?
What test instrumentation is required?
16. What form of test design will yield unequivocal
answers to questions of the effectiveness,
operability and maintainability of the system?
What is the most economical way of implementing the
test design required?
In the U.S. Navy these later needs are often met through
the research and analysis efforts of the Operational Test
and Evaluation Force (Carmody, 1972). COMOPTEVFORINST
3930. IF Volume II (13 November 1970) is a two inch thick
document which contains numerous human factors references
and checklists for use in systems evaluations. Examples
of the type of material contained in this reference are:
1. Chapter 3, Human Factors (52 pages).





3. Sonar/Radars/Fire Control Systems Checklist (18 pages)
k. Weapons Systems Checklist (6 pages).
5. Communications Checklist (10 pages).
6. Electronic Systems Checklist (6 pages).
7. Annex E, Human Engineering Questionnaire (2 pages),
with Worksheet (8 pages).
8. Personnel and Training Master Questionnaire (2 pages),
with Personnel Data Sheet (2 pages), and Personnel
and Training Requirements Assessment Questionnaire
(38 pages)
.
Numerous related Tables and Figures are also provided.
Easterby (1967) makes very clear the limitations of
checklists such as this. Its limitations are that it is
at best an analytical tool; not one for synthesizing a new
development but rather for attacking something wrong. Given
a set of objectives to be achieved within given constraints
and with specified resources, a checklist is of little value.
As a data-gathering tool, a checklist has its value, but it
provides very little insightful activity for the formulation
of solutions. The checklist provided here is a carefully
organized series of questions to assure the best possible
acquisition of data. The complementary purpose is to guide,
systematize, and force the asking of pertinent questions.
2 . Human Engineering Measure of Effectiveness Criteria
The human factors principles presented in this paper,
coupled with the questions suggested by this Checklist, will
provide the means to obtain the human factors goals which
are most important to destroyer operations. The payoff in
human engineering is determined by concrete operating
dividends which manifest themselves in the performance of
the final system. Some typical criteria, which can be used
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as yardsticks for assessing the effectiveness of the human
engineering effort, are described below (Adapted from Van
Cott and Kinkade, 1972):
1. Improved Performance . The man with the "right
assignment," the "right tasks," the "right equipment,"
and the "right environment" is likely to be an
efficient equipment operator or maintenance
technician.
2. Reduced Training Costs . A man needs less training
to operate a device when both the device and the
operational procedures are properly engineered for
human use. If he fits the device and the device
fits him, and if the task procedures are optimum,
he reaches the required standard or proficiency with
less expenditure of time, money, and effort.
3- Improved Manpower Utilization . Tasks and tools are
optimally human engineered when they minimize the
need for special skills or high aptitudes in the
human operator. More of the manpower pool can then
be trained to do the tasks, thereby improving man-
power utilization. A measure of the human engineering
contribution to system design is the percentage of
the available manpower that can perform the required
tasks. In the face of limited manpower resources,
it is essential that our human resources be used with
utmost effectiveness.
4. Fewer Losses From Accidents and Misuse . Poor equip-
ment design causes many of the accidents commonly
attributed to human error. Poorly designed equipment
tends to be used incorrectly or not at all.
5
.
Increased Economy of Production and Maintenance .
Simplification of design often results in devices
that are not only easier to operate, but simpler to
manufacture and maintain. The application of the
principles of human engineering will frequently lead
to more economical production and maintenance, in
addition to increased operator effectiveness.
6. Improved User Acceptance . A good system designed for
ease of operation and maintenance, as well as for the
safety and protection of its personnel, inspires
confidence and increases efficiency. While some
frustrations are inevitable, one goal of human
engineering is to ensure that frustrations caused by
troublesome or hazardous equipment or procedures are
reduced to a minimum.
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Criteria such as "Performance," "Manpower Utilization,"
and "User Acceptance" may be adequate to justify certain
modifications or alterations at a strictly local level,
however as these same recommendations are passed to higher
levels for review, or proposals are considered for fleet-wide
applicability, more specific or quantitative measures of
effectiveness are often sought. For example, in analysis of
the Pilot Program for the CNO Shipboard Automation and
Manpower Reduction Project; Destroyer Development Group (1973)
considered not only subjective evaluation's of Commanding
Officers and Officers of the Deck, but also considered such
specific criteria as:
1. How well does the steersman steer?
2. How quickly does the watch react to ship control
orders?
3. How well does the 00D maintain station?
4. How well does the signalman perform?
5. How well does the lookout perform?
6. How well are tactical circuits employed?
7. How well is the bridge supported by the CIC?
8. How well does the bridge perform administrative
functions?
9- How efficient is the interchange between the signal
bridge, the CIC, and the bridge?
10. If applicable, who augmented the five-man bridge watch?
11. How long was the bridge watch augmented?
12. Why was the bridge watch augmented?
lUk

The question "How well does the steersman steer?"
can be answered by collecting data on ship's base course
and actual course at randomly selected times. Similarly,
reaction to ship control orders could be measured by
observing times of helm or engine order changes and times
of response. Desired and actual range and bearing to the
guide at randomly selected times could measure the OOD's
station-keeping ability. A conclusion or recommendation
based on this type of data, where some measurable change or
improvement is obtained, is often more acceptable than the
identical conclusion based on opinion or experience.
C. PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION
1. Human Values
Recent Navy Initiatives have struck directly at
"contact point facilities," such as disbursing and personnel
offices, and have had considerable impact on shipboard
administration. The Chief of Naval Operations (1970a) in a
personal message to all Commanding Officers encouraged
improvement of standards of service at facilities which deal
in services to or for people. Other directives focused on
different aspects of shipboard life, and in some cases
caused routines to be changed that had previously been very
well established by tradition. "Z-Grams" that changed the
way things were done onboard ship may have included: (in
Bibliography enter with Z- (number):
Z-21 Encouraged CO's to give personnel standing holiday
duty compensatory time off.
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Z-25 Authorized the six-section (vice traditional four)
watchbill, permitted nested ships to combine duties.
Z-29 Encouraged CO's to grant five per cent leave while
ships are deployed overseas.
Z-32 Allowed person re-enlisting to arrange his own
ceremony in a way pleasing to him.
Z-38 Eliminated unnecessary work on Sunday.
Z-57 Eliminated certain "Mickey Mouse" regulations.
Z-70 Defined acceptable standards of grooming and dress.
Z-92 Extended privilege of civilian clothing aboard
ship to all non-rated men.
Z-106 Reiterated policy as to who should stand 00D and
Quarterdeck watches in port.
Z-112 Abolished certain shipboard collateral duties.
Individually, each of these initiatives has been criticized.
Collectively and with other measures they impact with
positive effect on a total Navy scheme. Criticisms similarly
have been aimed at ship's recreation programs, which dilute
the ship's duty section or work force at inopportune times.
Ship's picnics, long weekends, working parties, mess cook
assignment policy: the list is seemingly endless, but each
item in turn has been denounced by one or more individuals.
Olmstead (1963) seemed at once to put matters in perspective
when he spoke before the Navy Industrial Relations Institute:
"...organizations have a responsibility to wisely handle
the human, as well as the operational, aspects of their
affairs. This realization is becoming more widespread
within our society, although there seems to be a continuing
confusion in many organizations, both within and outside the
government, as to what this means and how to accomplish it.
"Admittedly, human behavior is complex, and our know-
ledge of it is far from perfect. However, there is a great
wealth of values, beliefs, and ideas available to draw upon
in handling the human aspects of administrative responsibilities
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In this regard, I wish to suggest one major thought. There
does not appear to be any one formula or set of formulas,
which will provide ready-made answers to most administrative
problems. This is because human behavior occurs in specific
situations which have endless variety. In any situation,
the following factors are always present, among others: the
dimension of time—the situation has a history, a present,
and a future; the physical location of the situation; the
organizational purpose or mission of the unit; the equipment;
the work methods and systems; the costs; the timing of
controllable events; and the people present in the organiza-
tion and in the related areas. Thus, it is clear that people
are not the only elements which have to be considered in an
organization. The manager is administering the total situ-
ation which includes both human and non-human elements."
"...administration has been studied from many viewpoints
over a long period of time, and some fundamental principles
are usually agreed upon as being sound. These include the
desirability of a clear organizational purpose, a reasonable
formal organization, intelligent planning, good work methods,
and periodic review of accomplishments. HOWEVER A STRICTLY
LOGICAL HANDLING OP THESE PRINCIPLES DOES MOT SEEM TO BE ALL
THAT IS REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH AN OUTSTANDING JOB OF ADMINIS-
TRATION. THE SUCCESSFUL INCORPORATION OF THE HUMAN FACTOR
INTO ADMINISTRATION AT ALL POINTS SEEMS TO BE DESIRED BY
EMPLOYEES, BY MANY MANAGEMENTS, AND BY SOCIETY IN GENERAL."
2. Systems Approach
It is the perspective from the top that the Commanding
Officer has that determines the optimum "mix" between the
human and non-human elements of his command. As we have seen
time and again in this paper, the two are not clearly
separable; and the desired objective of maximizing destroyer
performance (by whatever measure chosen) will be achieved not
by considering how one or the other of the elements may be
affected by a particular decision, but rather by considering
the total situation. It is this systems approach that is so




A. APPLICATION OP BASIC FUNDAMENTALS
Reviewing human factors literature related to destroyer
operations reveals a great number of conceptual ambiguities
(and even methodological deficiencies). Investigators have
tended to pay little attention to their dependent variables.
Hypotheses were not clearly stated, and we found inadequate
analyses and unwarranted conclusions. Fistabein and Aj zen
(1972) in a related matter found that
"a relatively small number of assumptions or hypotheses
continue to persist in the face of repeated failures to
support their validity. Instead of questioning these
assumptions, investigators will discover weaknesses in
previous studies and hypothesize that by making a few
changes they can strengthen the procedures and increase
the probability of confirming the "true" hypothesis.
As Meehl (1967) pointed out,
"in this fashion a zealous and clever investigator can
slowly wend his way through a tenuous nomological
network, performing a long series of related experiments
which appear to the uncritical reader as a fine example
of 'an integrated research program,' without ever once
refuting or corroborating so much as a single strand of
the network."
In the field of human factors, what is required are not
additional studies of this type, but rather thoughtful
application of basic fundamentals to the problems confronting
us.
In one important respect the information contained in
this paper is timeless. The subject has been the human being,
and how he interacts with the equipment he operates and
maintains. In fifty years, much of today's modern equipment
will be obsolete, but the human factors which determine how
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man will operate tomorrow's machinery are fundamental
principles which will remain unchanged. We will certainly
learn more about human response, and may through knowledge
be able to modify certain response patterns to greater
advantage than we do today, but our inborn capabilities and
limitations as components in tomorrow's systems will be
invariant.
B. PRACTICAL EXAMPLE OF HUMAN FACTORS METHODOLOGY
It is hoped that in many areas we can improve today's
operations by greater awareness of presently known funda-
mentals. As a practical example consider a case where a
ship has installed a remote alarm sensing panel (RASP) on
the bridge, which continuously monitors the condition of
the ship's navigation lights. If a light goes out, the
panel automatically shifts the bulb to a secondary filament,
and simultaneously gives an audible and visual indication
of the problem so that maintenance personnel can respond
and replace the bulb. The equipment works reliably, and
over the course of a few years it seems that requiring the
lookout to lean over the side of the ship every thirty
minutes to inspect the light (Navy Regs, Article 1010, 19^8)
is superfluous. Attempting to peer through a peep-hole
drilled in the deck, or holding a swab or broom over the
side in an attempt to observe a reflection, is equally
awkward and perhaps unnecessary with RASP. Trying to
coordinate the reports of three lookouts, who are reporting
the condition of no fewer than five navigational lights,
1H9

appears to be just too much for the Quartermaster of the
Watch who has "more important things to do" anyway. With
all the other activities of the bridge watch, wouldn't it
be simpler and more efficient to simply eliminate these
reports? Couldn't the 00D concentrate better on more
important matters if he did not have to receive and acknow-
ledge these seemingly trivial reports?
No matter how hectic the activity in the pilot house,
often the lookout stands alone, left to his own thoughts
and solo search for long periods. If watching is not
challenging to him, his efficiency deteriorates by the
minute. If the ship's visual search is to be effective, the
lookout must be alert. Think of how important the routine
requirement to have the lookout initiate a light report is
in terms of maintaining his alertness. This interruption,
the requirement for him to do something, will possibly
reduce if not eliminate whatever decrement had built up
since the beginning of his vigil. Consider the implications
of this observation. In this case, we will achieve better
performance (visual search) by applying our knowledge of
human factors, and NOT letting an automatic device (RASP)
take over a simple monitoring function. We also realize
how to protect the lookout's night vision from the harmful
effects of looking directly into these lights, and are aware
of the importance of providing this protection.
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C. "MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS FOR WAR SERVICE"
The specific question of replacing a reporting or
monitoring requirement with RASP may never come up on a
particular ship. But questions like it will, and the
opportunity is all around us to apply the human factors
principles discussed in this paper. It is common for example
to find individuals who insist that the sound powered phone
circuit which joins CIC and the lookouts not be used for
idle chatter. "No smoking by the lookouts," and "No eating
on watch," are other common commandments envoked in the name
of running an efficient watch. We should question these
policies in the light of human factors information presently
available; and if through such questioning we begin to make
certain policy adjustments, then we will have taken a first
step towards reaching our goal of better destroyer operations.
As required by General Order No. 21 (Navy Regulations,
19^8), the Commanding Officer shall: "Exert every effort to
maintain his command in a state of maximum effectiveness for
war service consistent with the degree of readiness pre-
scribed by proper authority." Human factors will be the
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